Seven Questions for Professor Jaffat
George Anastaplo*
We must not expect that liberal education can ever
become universal education. It will always remain the obligation and the privilege of a minority. Nor can we expect
that the liberally educated will become a political power in
their own right. For we cannot expect that liberal education
will lead all who benefit from it to understand their civic
responsibility in the same way or to agree politically. Karl
Marx, the father of communism, and Friedrich Nietzsche,
the stepgrandfather of fascism, were liberally educated on a
level to which we cannot even hope to aspire. But perhaps
one can say that their grandiose failures make it easier for
us who have experienced those failures to understand again
the old saying that wisdom cannot be separated from moderation and hence to understand that wisdom requires unhesitating loyalty to a decent constitution and even to the cause
of constitutionalism. Moderation will protect us against the
twin dangers of visionary expectations from politics and
unmanly contempt for politics. Thus it may again become
true that all liberally educated men will be politically moderate men. It is in this way that the liberally educated may
again receive a hearing even in the market place.
-

Leo Strauss'

PROLOGUE

The reader who has had the privilege of studying the
essays by Harry V. Jaffa collected in this issue of the Univer-

sity of Puget Sound Law Review should be able to appreciate
what has long been evident about the work of a scholar whose
considerable learning is surpassed only by his dedicated pas-

t Copyright © 1987 by George Anastaplo.
* A.B., 1948, J.D., 1951, Ph.D., 1964, The University of Chicago; Professor of Law,
Loyola University of Chicago; Professor Emeritus of Political Science and of
Philosophy, Rosary College; and Lecturer in the Liberal Arts, The University of
Chicago.
1. L. STRAuSS, LIBERALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 24 (1968). On liberal education,
see infra note 13.

508

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 10:507

sion.2 It should be evident as well why Professor Jaffa has
been able to enlist as he has, for some years now, so many talented young people for an unrelenting crusade to save our
country from the deadly follies of liberals and conservatives
alike.
My longstanding assessment of Mr. Jaffa's work is indicated in the Introduction I made of him for a "Conversation"
at Rosary College on December 4, 1980.' That Introduction
and the interesting colloquy which followed have been published by Mr. Jaffa in his most recent book.4 My 1980 Introduction of him went something like this:
It is my privilege to introduce on this occasion a friend
of a quarter century and a distinguished political scientist,
Harry V. Jaffa, of Claremont Men's College and Claremont
Graduate School. Professor Jaffa, whose appearance at
Rosary College has been made possible by the support of
him by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, is available this
afternoon for an extended conversation with us about matters ancient and modern.
Mr. Jaffa is, to my mind, the most instructive political
scientist writing in this country today. The things he writes
about range from Socrates and Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas
and William Shakespeare, from the Founding Fathers to
Abraham Lincoln, from Tom Sawyer and Winston Churchill
to contemporary politics and the joys of cycling.
I am reminded, when I encounter Mr. Jaffa, of another
provocatively influential American, a great woman who died
only this past weekend, Dorothy Day of the Catholic Worker
movement (whom I was privileged to see close-up only
2. All quotations in my text from Mr. Jaffa are, unless otherwise indicated, from
his U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. article. For a recent discussion by Mr. Jaffa of related

issues, see his article on Abraham Lincoln in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1162-66 (1986). For additional discussion by Mr. Jaffa of these issues,
see in.fra notes 4, 19, & 21.
3. Other assessments by me of Mr. Jaffa's work may be found in Anastaplo,
Prophets and Heretics, 23 MODERN AGE 314 (1979) (which I quote from in infra note
30) and in those things of mine cited in infra notes 19, 22, & 27. Mr. Jaffa has spoken
kindly, in public, of my article on the Declaration of Independence (see infra note 20),
of my article on the Emancipation Proclamation (see injfra note 41), and of my essay
on the Nixon-impeachment campaign in ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN:
ESSAYS ON VIRTUE, FREEDOM AND THE COMMON GOOD 160 (1975) [hereinafter HUMAN
BEING AND CITIZEN] (see infra note 30).
4. See H. JAFFA, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 48
(1984). The transcript of this two-hour conversation at Rosary College had been

previously published by Mr. Jaffa in the December 1981 issue of the CLAREMONT
REVIEW OF BOOKS.
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once). It was true of Miss Day, as it is true of Mr. Jaffa, that
it was virtually impossible for her not to be interesting about
whatever she wrote. Intelligence, hard work, and a gift for
language no doubt contribute to this capacity to invest every
discourse with significance. But fundamental to such influence is a certain integrity, even a single-minded moral fervor. Thus, it could be said of Miss Day in her obituary in the
New York Times on Monday of this week that she had
sought "to work so as to bring about the kind of society
where it is easier for people to be good." Much the same can
be said about Mr. Jaffa. Indeed, Miss Day, in the way she
lived her life, in an unrelenting effort to better the lives of
the downtrodden, could be said to have put into practice the
much-quoted proposition by Mr. Jaffa which was used by
Senator Goldwater in his Acceptance Speech upon being
nominated for the Presidency by the Republican Party in
1964, "I would remind you that extremism in the defense of
liberty is no vice. And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue."
A little more should be said by me about Mr. Jaffa now,
if only to suggest matters that we might want to talk about
on this occasion. A few differences between us, of which I
was reminded when I heard him speak yesterday at Loyola
University, could usefully be indicated.
Mr. Jaffa not only makes far more of exercising than I
do-I limit myself to walking whenever possible and to the
avoidance of elevators for ascents or descents of less than
five floors-but he also is a much more vigorous moralist
than I am, both in regulating his own conduct and in judging
the conduct of others. I believe that I allow more than he
does for good-intentioned errors, for inefficiency on the part
of people, and for circumstances which account for, sometimes even justify, what seem from the outside to be moral
aberrations. Compassion can be almost as important as
moral indignation in these matters, particularly with respect
to domestic relations, whether the subjects be abortion,
divorce, or homosexuality. Perhaps also I make more than
he does of the importance-if only out of respect for the sensibilities of others and for the moral tone of the community-of discretion, if not even of good-natured hypocrisy.
We differ as well with respect to the conduct of foreign
relations. We do share an abhorrence of tyranny, whether of
the Right or of the Left. But we sometimes part company on
assessments of how constitutional government and American republicanism can best be defended abroad. Thus, he
was much more hopeful than I could ever be that our
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involvement in the Vietnam War (however noble in intention that might have been, and that it surely was, in some
respects)-he was much more hopeful than I was that our
Vietnam involvement could do the American or the IndoChinese people some good. Today we differ as to precisely
what kind of a threat the Russians pose to us. I see them as
much more vulnerable (both politically and militarily) than
does he: and I consider all too many calculations about
nuclear-war "scenarios" to depend too much on game theories and not enough on political judgment. I believe, for
example, that Russian leaders are much more constrained by
domestic public opinion (by a pacific, even though patriotic,
public opinion) and by other factors than many of us recognize. They have suffered, at home and abroad, a considerable setback in Afghanistan; we can only hope that they, and
we, do not suffer an even greater setback by a Russian invasion of Poland. But whatever happens in Poland, it is now
evident that the cause of freedom is bound to be in better
shape in Eastern Europe than it has been since the Second
World War-in part because of what Polish workers have
done in showing the world how things really stand there.
The only question may be what price the Polish people will
have to pay, and this may depend, in part, on their prudence
and on ours.
Perhaps at the heart of the differences between Mr.
Jaffa and me-whether the differences be as to the status of
exercise or as to assessments of the Russians-is with
respect to how much one should be concerned with the preservation of one's life. An immoderate cherishing of what
happens to be one's own can lead, it seems to me, to psychic
paralysis or to undue combativeness: either can undermine
that relaxed competence which makes healthy statesmanship more likely. Certainly, Mr. Jaffa responds much more
than I do to the apocalyptic as against the comic and somewhat less than I do to "liberty" as against "equality." Obviously, we touch here on questions about the nature of
human existence, of virtue, and of happiness.
On the other hand, at the heart of our deep affinitiesbesides the fact that we were both fortunate enough to share
a great teacher in Leo Strauss-is our minority belief that
fundamental to sensible political science and to a decent life
as a community is a general respect for natural right and
what is known as natural law. This means, among other
things, that discrimination based on arbitrary racial categories cannot be defended, especially by a people dedicated to
the self-evident truth that "all men are created equal." It
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also means that the family as an institution should be
supported.
I mention in passing that we do differ with respect to
the Equal Rights Amendment-but here I believe that Mr.
Jaffa, even though he puts what he says in terms of nature
in his opposition to that amendment, has allowed himself to
be unduly influenced by the antics and "principles" of a
minority of the proponents of that largely symbolic grace
note for our Constitution.
Be all this as it may, an informed study of nature in
human things is perhaps the most pressing demand in education today-and for this Mr. Jaffa, with his profound grasp
of the classical writers, of Shakespeare's thought, and of the
career of Abraham Lincoln, is an invaluable guide.
Permit me to close these introductory remarks by
returning to something else that has been said about Dorothy Day, something which (with appropriate adjustments)
can be applied to the tireless dedication Mr. Jaffa devotes to
his "conservative" creed and to his graduate students. We
are reminded by Dorothy Day's New York Times obituary
that Church officials in New York were "often sorely
tempted to rebuke Miss Day-her ardent support of Catholic
cemetery strikers a number of years ago especially irked
Cardinal Spellman-but they never could catch her in any
breach of Church regulations." Besides, the editor of Commonweal has observed, one of the bishops she fought with,
James Francis McIntyre (who later became a cardinal himself), "was afraid he just might be dealing with a saint." "He
was alluding to what has been called Miss Day's 'indiscriminate and uncompromising love of the Mystical Body' as well
as to her courage and her care for the poor in hospices she
established in New York and elsewhere."
But enough of this canonization of Harry Jaffa, who
does remind me in certain ways of St. Augustine. Any effort
at canonization, you recall, requires that the devil's advocate
have his say also. As you can see, I have had to take on
more than one role in introducing to you a gifted colleague
whom we are privileged to have with us today.
Some of you must have questions-but first, Mr. Jaffa
may have something to say in response to the remarks I
have made in an effort to guide the conversation I look forward to in the hours and years ahead.'
5. G. ANASTAPLO, THE ARTIST AS THINKER: FROM SHAKESPEARE TO JOYCE 476
(1983) [hereinafter ARTIST As THINKER]. Mr. Jaffa's immediate response to my
remarks was, "Well, thank you very much, Professor Anastaplo. I must say that that
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Several of the issues touched upon in this 1980 Rosary Colleg Introduction continue to interest me. They are reflected in
the questions inspired at this time by the four essays collected
here by Mr. Jaffa.6 I offer, in addition to fresh reflections
upon these questions, three appendices of my own which bear
upon various of the matters touched upon by Mr. Jaffa. These
previously-prepared appendices are entitled,
A. The Founders of Our Founders: Jerusalem, Athens, and
the American Constitution;
B. The Ambiguity of Justice in Plato's Republic;
C. Private Rights and Public Law: The Founders'
Perspective.
I offer as well, in my Epilogue on this occasion, the informed
observations of a scholar who comments upon differences
between Mr. Jaffa and myself.
The questions inspired by Mr. Jaffa testify to the instructive challenges he generously lavishes upon those who are fortunate enough to know his work. Wisdom, according to Leo
Strauss, consists more in clarifying fundamental problems and
alternatives than in providing answers and solutions.7 My
seven questions are accompanied by suggestions about some of
their presuppositions and implications. The seven questions,
which shall be developed in turn, are the following:
I. What more should be said on behalf of Attorney General Meese with respect to the matters touched upon by Mr.
Jaffa?
is the most remarkable introduction I have ever had or that I am ever likely to have."
Two hours later, at the end of the general discussion (see supra note 4), he concluded,
"Thank you for your introduction, which certainly inspired me, or gave me a sense of
responsibility to live up to." Mr. Jaffa subsequently spoke well of this introduction to
many others.
On Leo Strauss himself, see ARTIST AS THINKER at 250.
6. By "four essays" I mean Mr. Jaffa's introductory article and its three
appendices (as found in the 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 355 (1987)):

What Were the "Original Intentions" of the Framers of the Constitution of
the United States?
Appendix A: Attorney General Meese, the Declaration, and the Constitution;
Appendix B: Are These Truths Now, or Have They Ever Been, Self-Evident?
The Declaration of Independence and the United States of America on Their
210th Anniversary,
Appendix C: Original Intent and Mr. Justice Rehnquist.
7. See V. Gourevitch, A Reply to Gilden, in THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY:

A STRAUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE 110 (1987) (K.L. Deutsch & E.W. Softer, eds.) [hereinafter
THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY]. See also infra note 11.
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II. Does Mr. Jaffa recognize sufficiently the shortcomings
of the equality which he so eloquently extols?
III. Does Mr. Jaffa mean to leave the impression that
theory alone determines political practice?
IV. Is there not an inevitable tension, because of the very
nature of things, between philosophy and the city?
V. Does Mr. Jaffa mean to leave the impression that "the
consent of the governed" is for the Declaration of Independence, as well as for himself, a necessary basis for legitimate
government in all circumstances?
VI. Does Mr. Jaffa recognize sufficiently the merits of
that freedom which he routinely subordinates to equality?
VII. What more should be said on behalf of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Associate Justice Brennan with respect to the
matters touched upon by Mr. Jaffa?
I
What more should be said on behalf of Attorney General
Meese with respect to the matters touched upon by Mr. Jaffa?
Mr. Meese is given a hard time by Mr. Jaffa because he
ventured to suggest (in advocating "original intent") that "the
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Roger D. Taney [in the
Dred Scott case] read blacks out of the Constitution in order to
invalidate Congress' attempt to limit the spread of slavery."
Mr. Jaffa's immediate response is, "Unfortunately for Mr.
Meese's argument, no one, on or off the Court, has ever
expounded the theory of original intent with greater eloquence
or conviction than Chief Justice Taney in the case of Dred
Scott." It is difficult for me, however, to acclaim as "eloquent"
or to concede as "conviction" an argument which is patently
false. Critical to the highly questionable Taney argument is his
finding of what the general opinion was as to the status of
Africans for the statesmen who had insisted that "all men are
created equal."
Indicative of the 1776 opinion with respect to slavery is
what had been said by William Blackstone in 1765:
I have formerly observed that pure and proper slavery does
not, nay, cannot, subsist in England; such I mean, whereby
an absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over
the life and fortune of the slave. And indeed it is repugnant
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of natural law, that such a state
to reason, and the principles
8
should subsist any where.
Blackstone then exposes the "false foundations" upon which
various arguments for "the right of slavery" are based.
Whatever "the necessity of the case" obliged Americans to put
up with in 1776 and 1787-1789, the decisive case against slavery
was known, and respected, by thinking men in all of the thirteen States.
Mr. Meese is correct in sensing that Chief Justice Taney
did not truly believe in "original intent," else he would have
approached the slavery question quite differently. The Chief
Justice had already been shown by John C. Calhoun that the
only way to get around the true original intention of the Declaration of Independence on the issue of the status of slavery was
to disavow the Declaration. Taney could not do this in his circumstances; he was reduced instead to trying to reinterpret the
Declaration. One can see in Taney, as in Calhoun, how reason
can be subverted by passion.
Mr. Jaffa points out (in his criticisms of Mr. Meese) that
"Taney's opinion in Dred Scott did not invalidate any
attempted action of the Congress," since "the Missouri Compromise restriction of slavery" had been repealed in 1854. But
since Dred Scott's owner had taken him before 1854 into jurisdictions presumably covered by Congressional restrictions, it
could very much matter whether those restrictions had been
valid. The Taney opinion was also important, as Mr. Jaffa recognizes, for what it said about the Republican Party platform.
Nor should one accept as readily as Mr. Jaffa seems to do
the Taney proposition that the Constitution is friendly to slavery. Rather, the Constitution of 1787 can be read as reflecting a
grudging accommodation to slavery, as may be seen even in the
terms of the 1808 Clause in Section 9 of Article I. In addition,
it is recognized in the Fugitive Slave Clause that persons
claimed as slaves are held thus only by the positive laws of
States; they are not spoken of, as other persons on the run are,
as fugitives from justice. These are, I believe, readings consis8. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 411 (1765). See also

id. at 123: "And this spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and
rooted even in our very soil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in England,
falls under the protection of the laws, and with regard to all natural rights becomes eo
instanti a freeman."
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tent with Abraham Lincoln's.9
Two other dubious features of the Taney opinion in Dred
Scott, which Mr. Jaffa seems to acquiesce in, should be noticed.
One is that Congress could not act to restrict slavery in the
Territories if slaves were regarded as merely property. But
due process should not be taken to mean that particular kinds
of property cannot be singled out for special legislative treatment (and even complete suppression) in various circumstances. It is hardly likely that the State legislatures that
abolished property in slaves from 1776 on violated the due process clauses in their constitutions.
The other dubious feature in the Taney opinion to be
noticed here is the assumption that what the Court said in
defining the powers of Congress with respect to the Territories
was binding upon the Congress, and that the only way to get
around the Court's reading was by constitutional amendment.
The propriety of judicial review in such matters should not be
taken for granted-and I believe there are indications that Lincoln did not do so, however prudent he may have thought it to
acquiesce (at least for the time being) in what the Court had
done in a particular case. 10
II.
Does Mr. Jaffa recognize sufficiently the shortcomings of
the equality which he so eloquently extols?
Mr. Meese can perhaps be chided for not appreciating the
full implications of the insistence by the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal." Dedication to
equality can no doubt contribute to justice and the common
good, standing as a bulwark against tyranny. But it can also
lead to an emphasis upon self-centeredness and upon private
9. For my discussion of slavery and the Constitution, see Anastaplo, The American
Alcibiades? 25 MODERN AGE 106 (1981); Anastaplo, Mr. Crosskey, the American
Constitution, and the Natures of Things, 15 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 181 (1984); Anastaplo,
Slavery and the Constitution, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. - (1986-87); note 9 of Anastaplo,
The United States Constitution of 1787: A Commentary, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 15 (1986)
[hereinafter A Commentary] (see infra note 10); those things of mine cited in supra
note 3, and in infra notes 10, 12, 19, 20, 26, & 27; and infra appendix C.
10. For my discussions of the Constitution, see Anastaplo, How to Read the
Constitution of the United States, 17 Loy. U. OF CHIC. L.J. 1 (1985); Anastaplo,
Political Philosophy of the Constitution, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1417-20 (1986); A Commentary, supra note 9, at 15; those things of mine
cited in supra notes 3 & 9, and in infra notes 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 26 & 27; and infra
appendices A & C.

516

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 10:507

right--and these in turn can promote relativism, if not even
nihilism, and hence another kind of tyranny. Certainly, mediocrity can easily become the order of the day when equality is
made too much of. Perhaps it is this prospect that moves Mr.
Meese and his cohorts to be as apprehensive as they sometimes
seem to be about current egalitarian movements. In any event,
is it not "freedom," even more than "equality," which appeals
to mankind in the noblest opposition to slavery? May not this
be seen in Winston Churchill's greatest speeches during the
Second World War?
III.
Does Mr. Jaffa mean to leave the impression that theory
alone determines political practice?
Not enough seems to be made by Mr. Jaffa of nature (or
personal temperament) and of circumstances in everyday political life. If he did make more of these, he would not be as apt
as he is to subject political men to the most exacting philosophical scrutiny.
The fact remains that men can be fairminded and effective
statesmen without having much in the way of philosophical
astuteness. It is imprudent to regard as radically-flawed
human beings those political men who hold dubious theoretical
opinions. To do so leaves the philosopher without allies-and,
even worse perhaps, subverts the ability of decent men to do
good. Such an attitude can be discerned to have been critical to
the intolerance both of the Inquisition and of Stalinism.
Too much of an emphasis upon the theoretical may even
be seen in Mr. Jaffa's insistence upon the natural-right tradition of the Declaration of Independence to the virtual exclusion of the prescriptive rights of the English-speaking peoples.
This is to ignore the central place given in the Declaration to
the grievances grounded in the British Constitution.
IV.
Is there not an inevitable tension, because of the very
nature of things, between philosophy and the city?
Of course, Mr. Jaffa recognizes this tension, but one must
wonder whether he gives it sufficient weight. The limitations
of the city, and of political life, may be seen in the ambiguity of
justice, and of political life itself, in Plato's Republic.
Perhaps the most instructive essay in Mr. Jaffa's collection
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here is what he has to say about Leszek Kolakowski. But Professor Kolakowski, as a professional philosopher, can properly
be subjected to a degree of theoretical scrutiny which may be
inappropriate in dealing as Mr. Jaffa does with such political
men as Attorney General Meese, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Associate Justice Brennan.
Indeed, I dare to venture the opinion that even Mr. Jaffa's
beloved Abraham Lincoln is not the great theoretician that he
is sometimes taken to be. There is about Mr. Jaffa's passion in
these matters the eros of the political man rather than that of
the philosopher-of the political man who is driven to consider
as the very best whatever happens to be his own.
It may well be that underlying Mr. Jaffa's passion here is
his deep concern for the survival of philosophy itself. But both
philosophy and the city may be misconceived, and ill-served, if
they are brought together in the rationalistic fashion of the
Enlightenment. On the limitations, and even perils, of the
Enlightenment Mr. Jaffa can be most instructive.
V.
Does Mr. Jaffa mean to leave the impression that "the
consent of the governed" is for the Declaration of Independence, as well as for himself, a necessary basis for legitimate
government in all circumstances?
Perhaps "the consent of the governed" associated with the
Declaration of Independence can be translated into the terms
used by Plato and Aristotle, but not without significant distortion. Certainly, Plato and Aristotle, as well as the Bible, recognized the possibility of just regimes without benefit of the
consent of the governed. Mr. Jaffa, in his stance here, seems
more in the spirit of Rousseau, if not of the Enlightenment,
than in the spirit either of the Bible or of Classical Thought,
both of which he nevertheless looks up to.
To make too much of the consent of the governed may
even run the risk of enthroning positive law (in the form of
the will of the people) at the expense both of natural right and
of divine revelation. Mr. Jaffa does warn against this substitution-but his polemical thrusts sometimes move in a different
direction from his warning.
The Framers of the Constitution spoke again and again of
the merits of the British Constitution, a constitution which was
not grounded in that sense of "consent of the governed" that
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Mr. Jaffa finds to be demanded by the Declaration of Independence. Leo Strauss insisted again and again upon the superiority today of liberal democracy, even as he recognized its critical
limitations-and hence its inferiority to certain regimes (not
available, as a practical matter, in our time) which do not
depend upon consent of the governed. 1
I myself was obliged to recognize these reservations almost
two decades ago, in the opening note of my Constitutionalist:
"The tension evident in this study may be inevitable for anyone who tries to 'live with' both the Apology of Socrates and
the Declaration of Independence-for anyone, that is, who
finds himself drawn to two public declarations which are,
despite their superficial compatibility, radically divergent in
their presuppositions and implications. Thus, an attempt is
made herein to see American constitutional law and political
thought from the perspective of our ancient teachers."' 2
VI.
Does Mr. Jaffa recognize sufficiently the merits of that
freedom which he routinely subordinates to equality?
Of course, it is possible to see "freedom" and "equality" in
terms of each other. Even so, freedom tends to look more to
11. "That Leo Strauss and the classics, for all practical purposes, favored the rule
of law rather than of men and were averse to arbitrary government is not plain to all.
That is because although their support of the rule of law was unhesitating, their
approval of it was not unqualified." H. Gildin, Leo Strauss and the Crisis of Liberal
Democracy, in

THE

CRISIS OF

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, supra note

7, at 95.

"A

Communist society cannot regard anything as more sacred than itself, except perhaps
some future condition of itself. The plausibility of the case for liberal democracy
depends on the extent to which there are to be found, among the things that it regards
as higher in dignity than itself, things that truly are higher than it in dignity. Liberal
democracy continues to be the troubled repository of the great western tradition at the
same time that it harbors within itself tendencies that undermine it: thoughtless
conformism and mass culture are equally inimical to Biblical religion and to genuine
philosophical thought .... Liberal democracy gives the effort to preserve the western
tradition, in a manner worthy of that tradition, a fighting chance. This is another one
of the essential differences between it and communism that made Strauss give liberal
democracy his unhesitating support even though his approval of it was not and could
not be unqualified." Id. at 100; "I [have] tried to explain why, according to Strauss,
constitutional democracy comes closer today to what the classics require than does any
feasible alternative to it. This is very different from affirming that democracy is the
simply just political order, a view that I do not think he held." Id. at 122-123. See
infra note 30.
12. G. ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT
420 n.1 (1971). On the limitations of modern egalitarianism, see supra section 11 and
the passage quoted from my Prophets and Heretics,supra note 3, at 315-316 and infra
note 30. See also infra appendix C (e.g., section XII).
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excellence, or virtue (and hence philosophy), while equality
naturally tends to make more of private interests (and hence
certain kinds of revelation). It is for this reason that Plato and
Aristotle can be said to have been more open to claims based
on freedom than to those based on equality, something which
Leo Strauss himself pointed out on more than one occasion.
This is not to deny that freedom can deteriorate into simply living as one likes. This makes essential that liberal education which helps equip free men to make proper use-and to
want to make proper use--of their freedom."3
VII.
What more should be said on behalf of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Associate Justice Brennan with respect to the
matters touched upon by Mr. Jaffa?
Justice Brennan does stand for the rule of law.14 The misreadings of the Constitution that Mr. Jaffa laments have the
merits of an attempt to look beyond the Constitution to the
principles, or aspirations, which breathe life into our constitutional enterprise.
The Chief Justice, on the other hand, exhibited (as Associate Justice) respect for the primary purpose of the free-speech
guarantee of the First Amendment. Indeed, I have had occasion to say of him that "he can well become, among the members of the Court during the next decade, perhaps the closest
on First Amendment issues (except on the issue of obscenity)
to Hugo L. Black, the first (and probably the greatest) of the
' 15
New Deal Justices.

13. On liberal education, see the passage from Leo Strauss used as the epigraph to
this article and the passage from Laurence Berns used in the epilogue to this article.
For my discussions of liberal education, see the essays on Plato's Apology, on Plato's
Meno and on Plato's Crito in G. ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 3,
at 8; What Is a Classic? in THE ARTIST AS THINKER, supra note 5; Notes Toward an
'Apologiapro vita sua,' 10 INTERPRETATION 319 (1982); Aristotle on Law and Morality,
in 3 WINDSOR, YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE 458 (1983); The Teacher as Learner:
On Discussion, CLAREMONT REVIEW OF BOOKS 22 (Summer 1985); On How Eric

Vogelin Has Read Plato and Aristotle, INDEPENDENT J. PHILOSOPHY - (1986-87); and
infra appendices A & B. See also the Bibliography appended to Anastaplo,
Commentary on the Constitution, supra note 9, at 225. G. ANASTAPLO, ARTIST AS
THINKER, supra note 5 includes discussions of Shakespeare, Milton and Bunyan. See
infra appendix A, section I.
14. See Anastaplo, Justice Brennan, Due Process and the Freedom of Speech. A
Celebration of Speiser v. Randall, 19 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. - (1986) [herienafter
Justice Brennan, Due Process].
15. Anastaplo,
William
H.
Rehnquist
and
the
First Amendment,
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In any event, it is difficult to see what practical differences
there are likely to be, in terms of how cases should be decided,
between Mr. Jaffa and the Chief Justice, whatever theoretical
shortcomings Mr. Jaffa may discern in the Chief Justice. It is
to be hoped that the Chief Justice will not so forget himself,
and his high calling, as to subvert the teaching function of his
office by proclaiming from the Bench what one of his predecessors did (in order to justify packing some Communist Party
leaders off to jail in 1951),
Nothing is more certain in modern society than the principle
that there are no absolutes, that a name, a phrase, a standard
has meaning only when associated with the considerations
To those who
which gave birth to the nomenclature ....
would paralyze our Government in the face of impending
threat by encasing it in a semantic
straitjacket, we must
6
reply that all concepts are relative.'
It is politically salutary to acknowledge what is good about
both the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan. Thus, Justice
Brennan could say, upon the recent elevation of Justice Rehnquist, "He's going to be a splendid Chief Justice." Decent conservatives and decent liberals do have much in common. Our
regime depends upon the constant recognition by political men
of their affinities, despite their respective theoretical
shortcomings.' 7
For my discussions of freedom of speech, see
Anastaplo, Freedom of Speech and the Silence of the Law, (Book Review), 64 TEXAS L.
REV. 443 (1985) (reviewing F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY);
and those things of mine cited in supra notes 5, 9, 10, 12 & 13, and in infra notes 19, 20,
27 & 30.
16. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951) (Vinson, C.J.). Such
sentiments are regarded as respectable today among sophisticated people. See, e.g.,
Antoine, Integrity and Circumspection: The Labor Law Vision of Bernard D. Meltzer,
53 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 78 (1986) (opening paragraph); Rehnquist, The Notion of a
Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 704-706 (1976). Mr. Jaffa is properly
concerned lest the moral underpinnings of the American regime be undermined by the
thoughtlessness of people who should know better and who do "feel" better than they
(in their sophistication) say. In any event, it is salutary that "sophisticated"
jurisprudential speculations (if to be indulged in at all) should be interred in the law
review articles that judges write.
17. For the Brennan quotation, see Eisasser, Senate Groups Cram for Rehnquist
Quiz, Chicago Tribune, July 27, 1986, at 5, col. 3. See also Justice Brennan, Due
Process,supra note 14, at n.8.
Much is to be said for magnanimity if there is to be a healthy polity. The most
eloquent (and encouraging) recognition of the longstanding grievances of American
racial minorities that I heard during the recent mayoral contest in Chicago was made
(at the University of Chicago, on February 27, 1987) by an "ethnic" candidate (Edward
INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 31 (Spring 1987).
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I confess, that is, that I am not in these matters the purist
that Mr. Jaffa is. This is I suppose, another way of saying that
I may yet have a great deal to learn from him.
EPILOGUE

The reader may better grasp the questions I have posed
for Mr. Jaffa (as well as for myself) if he should be reminded
of how differences between us have developed heretofore.
Those differences are hinted at in the Introduction of Mr. Jaffa
reprinted in the Prologue to this article.
Our differences (and, of course, our affinities) are further
spelled out in a recent article by a scholar who has know Mr.
Jaffa and me for decades and who was also privileged to study
with Leo Strauss."8 Consider his instructive survey of our
situation:
The most impressive attempt known to me to combine

classical thought with the principles
is to be found in the work of Harry
most part confine myself here to his
ration of Independence in the essay,

of the American polity
V. Jaffa. I will for the
discussion of the Decla'What is Equality? The

Declaration of Independence Revisited.'1 9 Jaffa builds on
Vrdolyak) who has been in recent years the bitterest opponent of the incumbent
mayor (Harold Washington). Mr. Vrdolyak's testimonial to the enduring claims among
us of equality can easily be dismissed as mere politics. It can even be said that these
stated convictions do not come from the heart. But however that may be, the passions
are not all that count: such a public recognition as I heard from Mr. Vrdolyak, if
"only" in words, of the plight of minorities in this country reflects an informed
awareness even as it appeals to the passions (including the speaker's passions) through
the reason. Thus, we have come a long way in these matters from John C. Calhoun
and Roger D. Taney. In short, a useful magnanimity requires that one's opponents'
merits (apparent as well as genuine) be acknowledged and thereby reinforced. See the
text at infra note 27.
18. This scholar drawn upon here is Laurence Berns, a senior member of the
faculty of St. John's College, Annapolis, Md. His publications include L. Berns,
Aristotle's Poetics, in ANCIENTS AND MODERNS: ESSAYS ON THE TRADITION OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN HONOR OF LEO STRAuSS 70 (1964); L. Berns, Rational

Animal-Political AnimaL Nature and Convention in Human Speech and Politics, in

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JACOB KLEIN 29 (1976); L. Berns, Francis Bacon and the

Conquest of Nature, 8 INTERPRETATION 1 (1978); Berns, Speculations on Liberal and
Illiberal Politics, 40 THE REV. OF POLITICS 231 (1978); Berns, Book Review, 10
INTERPRETATION 322 (1982) 322. See also G. ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST 362

(1971); Berns, Two Old ConservativesDiscuss the Anastaplo Case, 54 CORNELL L. REV.
920 (1969) (this is the last article cited to by Professor Berns in the article from which
I quote at length here in my epilogue).
My notes 19 through 29 in this article are taken from notes 33 through 43, in
Professor Berns's article, infra note 30.
19. [This is note 33 in the Berns article, see infra note 30, from which I am quoting
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George Anastaplo's own observation that the references to
God in the Declaration of Independence portray him in
2°
terms of the three powers of constitutional government.
'All men are created equal' is interpreted by Jaffa in an
Aristotelian mode placing man between beasts and God. The
respects in which men are equal or the same is understood
'as much by understanding what he is not, as by understanding what he is....

Man is not either beast or God.'

The

three powers of government are properly united in God, but
never in human hands; that is, they are properly united in a
being that is the perfection of reason, justice, and mercy. It
is the very definition of tyranny to unite them in fallible
creatures like men, whose partial perfections are subject to
corruption by passionate self-love and other such influences.
'The equality of mankind is an equality of defect, as well as
an equality of rights.' The qualitative distinction between
animals that possess reason and beasts that do not is more
fundamental than any distinction of quantity or intensity of
possession between the possessors of reason. Just government presupposes sufficient enlightenment among human
beings to recognize that no rational animal is the proper subject of despotic rule, and no man is sufficiently godlike to be
entrusted with despotic rule. Reciprocal with these equalities of superiority and defect is the notion that consent is the
only just basis of government. Jaffa anticipates the objection
that consent is not an adequate replacement for wisdom as
the ground upon which rule can be legitimated. The claims
of wisdom have dubious political value because of 'the fact
that it is not the wise who advance under the banners of wisdom but rather pretenders to wisdom.' Leo Strauss's
account of the classical position in a way admits this last
point. The classics favored the rule of gentlemen, that element of society that through its wealth and leisure had the
greatest opportunities to acquire a liberal education, which
means an education that among other things fosters civil
responsibility. This points to the ultimate justification of the
rule of gentlemen: the rule of gentlemen is the political
THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 14960 (1975). I shall not discuss here Jaffa's remarkable book on Lincoln, H. JAFFA, THE
CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED. (1959). For a criticism and appreciation of Jaffa's
Lincoln book, which moves on a philosophical plane commensurate with Jaffa's plane,
see George Anastaplo, American Constitutionalism and the Virtue of Prudence:
Philadelphia,Paris, Washington, Gettysburg, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE GETTYSBURG
ADDRESS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 165-68 n.64 (1976).
20. [This is note 34 in the Berns article, infra note 30, from which I am quoting
here.] George Anastaplo, The Declarationof Independence, 9 ST. Louis UNIV. L. J. 390
(Spring 1965). [See also infra note 30.]

here.] H. JAFFA,
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reflection on the, for almost all political purposes, impossible
rule of the philosophers, the rule of 'the men best by nature
and best by education.' 21 Jaffa is aware of the impoverishment that would attend the removal of such political
reflections.
An interesting contrast to the classicism of Harry Jaffa
is to be found in the classicism of George Anastaplo. While
Jaffa emphasizes the natural equities of superiority and
defect upon which the moral principles governing the American polity are based, the central consideration for Anastaplo's 'Constitutionalist' are the blessings of liberty. He
reviews Jaffa's Equality and Liberty in an article entitled
'Liberty and Equality.' 22 Civil liberties, in contrast to civil
rights, make for popular influence over, as well as protection
against, government. But most importantly during 'a time of
effective popular rule,' they provide for the protection of
minorities from the encroachment of majorities, for the protection within democratic government for natural aristocracy.
While Jaffa's rhetoric emphasizes the transformation
of self-evident truth into 'living faith,' the sacramental character of our moral and political principles, 24 Anastaplo
recurs to the distinctions between human being and citizen,
politician and scholar, thoughtful man and partisan, and
nature and circumstance. 25 The inevitable partiality and relativity of any effective political statement point to prudence
and moderation as indispensable political virtues-even in
26
the pursuit of justice.
The most useful way of beginning to account for these
21. [This is note 35 in the Berns article, infra note 30, from which I am quoting

here.] L. STRAuss,
EQUALITY

AND

LIBERALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 11-16. (1955). Cf H. JAFFA,
LIBERTY 50-52 (1965). Cf. Hamilton's arguments against ancient

political thought and practice in Flaumenhaft, Alexander Hamilton on the
of Good Government, THE POLITICAL Sc. REV. 143-2 (Fall 1976).
22. [This is note 36 in the Berns article, infra note 30, from which I
here.] G. ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN (1975) (essay V).
ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTrrTTIONALIST ch. 8 (1971).
23. [This is note 37 in the Berns article, infra note 30, from which I

here.] See G.

ANASTAPLO,

THE CONSTITUTIONALIST,

Foundation
am quoting
Cf. also G.
am quoting

ch. 8, Sec. ix, and Thomas

Jefferson's letter to John Adams, October 28, 1813.
24. [This is note 38 in the Berns article, infra note 30, from which I am quoting
here.] H. JAFFA, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY, 139 (1965); H. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE
DIVIDED 227, 232, and 239 (1959).
25. [This is note 39 in the Berns article, iitfra note 30, from which I am quoting
here.] G. ANASTAPLo, HuMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, essays III, X, and XVI.
26. [This is note 40 in the Berns article from which I am quoting here.] See G.
ANASTAPLo, Citizenship, Prudence and Classics, THE ARTIST As THINKER 279-83
(1983); see also L. STRAuSs, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY ch. 4 (1953) [See as well
infra appendix B].
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differences may well be in terms of different judgments
about the needs of our situation, about 'the crisis of liberal
democracy,' about the political conditions for philosophizing
on the one hand and the reliability of nature on the other.
The moral fervor of the political savior is not usually
associated with the cool deliberation of the man of prudence.
And yet both Jaffa and Anastaplo find their paradigms in
Abraham Lincoln. After a careful line-by-line analysis of
the Emancipation Proclamations, 'recreating' the complex of
problems Lincoln had to deal with, Anastaplo reflects on
prudence in general:
We see, of course, what prudence can mean in a
particular situation-and hence what prudence
itself means. One must adjust to one's materials,
including the prejudices and limitations of one's
community. Such adjustment often includes settling for less than the best. But the most useful
adjustment is not possible unless one does know
what the very best would be. We can also sense,
upon the study of the doings of prudent men, how
important chance is in human affairs--and hence
how limited we often are in what we can do, even
when we know what should be done.
We should notice as well, and guard against,
that fashionable opinion which dismisses what is
reasonable and deliberate as cold-blooded and calculating. It is also important, however, if one is to be
most effective as a reasonable, deliberate and deliberating human being, to seem other than coldblooded and calculating-that is, it is important to
be a good politician. Once again we are reminded of
the importance in political things of appearances, of
a healthy respect for the opinions (and hence the
errors as well as the sound intuitions) of mankind.
Certainly, self-righteousness should always be held
in check, but not always a show of indignation.
Still, indignation even in a good cause should be
carefully watched. Consider, for example, the
famous Abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison's 1831
promise, 'I will be as harsh as truth, and as uncompromising as justice. On this subject I do not wish
to think, or to speak, or write, with moderation.'
Such passion may be useful, even necessary, if great
evils are to be corrected, but only if a Lincoln
should become available to supervise what finally
happens and to deal prudently with others (zealous
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friends and sincere enemies alike) with a remarkable, even godlike, magnanimity.2 7
Last but not least, the classicial emphasis on the ethical
implications of all political arrangements reminds us conversely that every political arrangement presupposes certain
qualities in the populace that is to live under that arrangement. Free government based on enlightened consent is not
going to survive if its citizens are regarded as unworthy of
such government and if they are incapable of making it
work. The cultivation of excellence, or, more euphemistically, liberal education for leadership, may be indispensable
for the survival of such government. If it should be that
capacities for liberal education are not created equal in all
men, religious education for all the people must supplement
liberal education. Did the Founding Fathers rely on the virtues of a religiously trained populace without making provision for the continuance of that training? 28 However that
may be, although they did concentrate more on the structures of government, they did not forget the character of the
people. 'As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which
requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so
there are other qualities in human nature which justify a
certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a
higher degree than any other form.' 29 Classical and American thought seem to come together most in their reliance on
'moral principles grounded in thoughtfulness,' political
prudence (that is, the avoidance of unreasonable expectations)
27. [This is note 41 in the Berns article, infra note 30, from which I am quoting
here.]
G. Anastaplo, Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, IN
CoNsTrruTIoNAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 439 (1980). In the context of a discussion
of the right and the wrong way to argue against censorship, Anastaplo gives voice to
what has become a growing concern in his recent writings: "Indeed, we may have
more to fear from a lack of concern about abuses of our considerable liberties than we
have from threats of immediate restrictions upon them." Anastaplo, Human Nature
and the First Amendment, 1979 UNIV. PITT. L. REV. 746. Cf. 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITTANNICA Censorship, 634 (15th ed. 1986).
28. [This is note 42 in the Berns article, infra note 30, from which I am quoting
here.] "Heaven grant that it may be the glory of the United States to have established
two great truths, of the highest importance to the whole human race: first, that an
enlightened community is capable of self-government; and, second, that the toleration
of all sects does not necessarily produce indifference to religion." Daniel Webster,
speech, reception at Pittsburgh, 8 July 1833. Cf. II A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA ch. 15; XENOPHON, MEMORABILIA, IV,

ch. 3.1, 3.2. See also the remarkable

biologist's account of "the distress of the modern soul" by J. MONOD, CHANCE AND
NECESSITY 164-73 (1972).

29. [This is note 43 in the Berns article, infra note 30, from which I am quoting
here.] The Federalist,no.55.
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and the concern for enlightenment (that is, liberal
education)....
[I have dealt here] with two thinkers who have, with the
aid of Leo Strauss and others, liberated themselves from the
powerful dogma that a return to classical thought is impossible and devoted themselves to studies in depth of American
thought and institutions. In interesting and complementary
ways the principles, problems, and virtues of the modern
American polity have been shown to require for their clarification not only modern philosophy but also the 'premodern
thought of our western tradition.' We note that when
Strauss speaks of our western tradition, he refers not only
to classical philosophy but also to the Bible. This side of the
in the work of Jaffa, but it is
tradition is more conspicuous
30
not ignored by Anastaplo.
30. L. Berns, Aristotle and the Moderns on Freedom and Equality, in THE CRISIS
OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 156-59. I have incorporated in the long
passage quoted here recent corrections made by Mr. Berns. My notes 19 through 29 in
this article have been taken in their entirety (except for the bracketed material) from
notes 33 through 43 in the Berns article.
Mr. Berns notices (at infra note 20 in my text, which is at note 34 in his text) my
1965 observations about the references to God in the Declaration of Independence. I
have recently developed further those observations in my Commentary on the
Constitution,supra note 9, at 38-39:
The affinity between the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution of 1787 is further suggested by certain implications of the
spearation-of-powers approach in the Constitution, a principle which had been
considerably compromised in the Articles of Confederation.
Various of the grievances in the Declaration of Independence, and the
way government itself is spoken of there, presuppose a separation-of-powers
approach much like that made explicit in the Constitution. We can even see
in the references to divinity in the Declaration of Independence an oblique
anticipation of the qualified separation of powers found in the Constitution
itself. There are four references to divinity in the Declaration. The first
reference, and perhaps the second as well, regarded God as legislator; it is He
that orders things, ordaining what is to be. That is, He first comes to view as
lawgiver. Next, God is seen as judge. Finally, He is revealed as executive, as
One Who extends protection, enforcing the laws that have been laid down
(with a suggestion as well of the dispensing power of the executive). Thus, the
authors of the Declaration portrayed even the government of the world in the
light of their political principles.
In this way, at least, it can be argued that a republican regime is implied
by the Declaration of Independence, such a regime as may be seen in various
of the State constitutions of that period, in the Constitution of 1787, and even
(however distorted in some respects) in the British constitution. Among the
features of the republicanism endorsed by the Declaration are the consent of
the governed, a qualified separation of powers, and a proper respect for the
inalienable rights of mankind.
I referred in my first lecture to the natural constitutionalism of the
Declaration of Independence. Is it not appropriate, therefore, that the
deference in the Declaration to 'the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God'
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Is it not evident from this survey by Laurence Berns why we
should all be grateful to Professor Jaffa? He does oblige us to
think about the most important things, and to try to do so in a
way worthy of our greatest teachers.
should be reflected in the understanding that the best ordering of human
things should take as its model the divine ordering of the world?
The Constitution of 1787 can plausibly be taken, then, as an incarnation of
the principles revealed in the Declaration of Independence. It may even be
the form of government most appropriate for the people of the Declarationthat is, for a people who could produce such a declaration. It is also a form of
government which, in this manifestation, had to defer to circumstances
(particularly the long-established institution of slavery) which left it deeply
flawed, but not without hope of eventual redemption.
Id.
These observations can be taken to provide qualified support for one aspect of the
position taken by Mr. Jaffa during the past decade against Walter Berns, Martin Diamond and Irving Kristol. This aspect of Mr. Jaffa's position, with respect to the relation between the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, is glanced at by
me in the third paragraph of the following comment upon his work some years ago:
Whatever differences I may have with Mr. Jaffa can, it seems to me, be
reconciled, especially since we do share certain critical opinions about the
dominant relativism and historicism among political scientists today. But,
then, his differences with Mr. Diamond and Mr. Kristol ...also seem to me to
be less serious than he likes to make them out to be.
Consider, for instance, the concern expressed by Mr. Diamond and Mr.
Kristol about the tendencies of egalitarianism toward utopianism, levelling
and populism. An equality hedged in as Mr. Jaffa hedges it need not arouse
their concern--except as to whether such hedges can be maintained in these
times. Mr. Jaffa does tacitly recognize their concerns, in the way he places his
hedges-concerns which go back to at least Tocqueville.
Or consider Mr. Jaffa's extended critique of Mr. Diamond for presuming
to say that the Declaration of Independence "is devoid of guidance" for the
institutions of government under the Constitution. Is it not evident that Mr.
Diamond meant that considerable leeway was left by the Declaration, that the
institutions to be established by a people depend to a considerable extent on
circumstances? There may have been something careless in Mr. Diamond's
rhetorical flourish here. But is it not evident that Mr. Diamond agreed with
the substance of what his tougher-minded critic has said on this score? And,
indeed, has not Mr. Jaffa himself said things, in his Conditions of Freedom
(e.g., pp. 114, 154-55, 158-59), which sound very much like what Mr. Diamond
has now been so vigorously rebuked for saying on this point?
Prophetsand Heretics, supra note 3, at 315-16. On the limitations of an emphasis upon
equality, see supra § II. On the continuing importance of the right of revolution, see
Anastaplo, What Is Still Wrong with George Anastaplo? A Sequel to 366 US. 82
(1961), 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 551 (1986).
On the relation of religion and politics, see Anastaplo, The Religion Clauses of the
FirstAmendment, 11 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 151 (1981); Anastaplo, On Speaking to and
for Mankind& The Laborem Exercens Encyclical of Pope John Paul 11, 42 CATHOLICISM
IN CRISIS 6 (No. 10 1983); infra appendix A. I anticipate, in my Notes Toward an 'Apologia pro vita sua', supra note 13, at 341-42, "a series of inquiries into the divine based
upon a recognition of that question which is fundamental to much of philosophy as
well as to theology-the question quid sit deus."
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APPENDIX A
THE FOUNDERS OF OUR FOUNDERS: JERUSALEM,
ATHENS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION

31

Behold, I have taught you statutes and judgments, even
as the Lord my God commanded me, that ye should do so in
the land whither ye go to possess it.
Keep therefore and do them; for this is your wisdom
and your understanding in the sight of the nations, which
shall hear all these statutes, and say, Surely this great nation
is a wise and understanding people.
-Deuteronomy 4: 5-6
I.
The Bicentennary of the Founding of these United States
as an independent community has stimulated interest in our
fundamental constitutional documents. This stimulation of
interest has not been limited to American constitutional documents. The dependence of the Founding Fathers upon British
constitutional experience has been noticed, with special attention having been paid by the Congress of the United States to
Magna Carta, an original copy of which has been lent us by the
British Parliament.
But in order to understand what we have come to be and
how, one should look beneath, if not beyond, both American
and British constitutional statements to what can be considered the underpinnings not only of the Anglo-American development but of Western civilization itself. That is, one must
look to those influences, rooted in Jerusalem and in Athens,
which appeal to the human being in us all, to human beings
who find themselves allocated to one of the political subdivisions of what we know as the West. Those influences find
authoritative expression in the books of the Bible and in the
dialogues of Plato. These divergent influences have found literary expression in such works as John Bunyan's Pilgrim'sPro31. A talk given by George Anastaplo at Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem,

North Carolina, October 8, 1976. The quotations from PARADISE REGAINED (cited as
P.R. in the text) are taken from J. Milton, COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE,

(Hughes, ed. 1957). This talk is dedicated to the memory of James A. Steintrager of
the University of Chicago and Wake Forest University. [At the author's request, the
footnotes are contained in the text and hence cannot conform to "Blue Book" style. -

The Editors]
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gress and William Shakespeare's plays, helping to shape
thereby American opinion.
To regard the Bible and the Platonic dialogues as contributors to our constitutional development is to recognize that any
analysis one might attempt of that development must be anything but comprehensive: it is to say that one must attempt to
plumb the depths of Western Civilization. But however inaccessible those depths may ultimately be, a preliminary survey
of our great heritage should be of some use.
II.
When one looks at Jerusalem, one confronts two principal
sets of doctrines-the Judaic and the Christian-with the latter claiming to be the destined fulfillment of the former. (A
third set, that of Islam, proclaims itself the true completion of
the other two.) It is the Christian set of doctrines which has
had, and continues to have, the more immediate influence
upon the West, and it is with this that we will primarily concern ourselves on this occasion in thinking about Jerusalem
and its relation to Athens.
When one looks at Athens, one confronts several sets of
doctrines, the various schools of thought which all trace their
origins to Socrates as somehow the founder of a way of life
rooted in moral philosophy. There has been in the West, for
almost two thousand years now, an uneasy, yet often fruitful,
relation between Athens and Jerusalem (or its pagan counterparts). Indeed, this tension may have been in large part
responsible for the remarkable accomplishments of the Westas well as for its curious psychic vulnerability. Of course, there
have been minds in whom thoughtful accommodations
between philosophy and religion have been made. One thinks
of Xenophon, Maimonides, Averroes, Alfarabi and, at times,
Thomas Aquinas. But even in those cases, there did remain
the question as to which is ultimately sovereign, philosophy or
religion.
In men of ordinary understanding-mere mortals like the
rest of us-thoughtful accommodations are much harder to
come by. Thus, we are familiar with free-thinking intellectuals
who call into question the religious traditions (or, as they
might even call them, the superstitions) of their time-so
much so in our own time as to threaten the continued appeal
and influence of organized religion. Thus, also, we are familiar
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with men of faith who confidently put pretenders to worldly
wisdom in their place. A professor of church history (he happens to be in a Greek Orthodox college, but it could be the college of any standard Christian sect) is asked, "Are there any
fundamental differences between Jesus and the great Greek
philosophers like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle?" The following answer is given,
There are many fundamental differences. Socrates and
others taught the uncertain philosophical conclusions of
their own limited and finite minds. Jesus taught infallible
and divine truth. The fruit of the teachings of these philosophers is a temporary proficiency in an imperfect human
knowledge. The fruit of the knowledge of Jesus Christ is
eternal happiness. In themselves these great Greek philosophers were men, but Jesus was God. His words are infallible
and eternal and have their value in all climates and
centuries.

And yet, as I have indicated, thoughtful men have worked
out responsible accommodations between these contending
approaches. But however smooth and enduring an accommodation may be, it cannot help but regard one or the other of the
two approaches as ultimately authoritative.
III.
The most interesting-that is to say, the most dramatictimes are those in which religion and "philosophy" struggle for
supremacy, in which whatever longstanding accommodation
there has been between them has (for one reason or another)
broken down. One such period was that in which Socrates
lived, especially in the closing years of his life, a time very
much unsettled by the trials and ultimate defeat of Athens
during the Peloponnesian War. This time of stress culminated,
for Socrates, in his prosecution, conviction, and execution on
charges which turned around his supposed refusal to acknowledge the gods of the city. Plato's Apology of Socrates remains
the most instructive account of what happened to Socrates on
that occasion.
Indeed, the Apology (or, rather, the combination of the
Apology, which reports the trial of Socrates, and the Crito,
which reports his refusal to accept the escape plan offered
him)-this combination of the Apology and the Crito is the
public document among the dialogues of Plato. It is this pair of
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dialogues which is most widely known and which has had the
greatest direct influence upon public opinion with respect to
the Socratic (or philosophic) way of life. This is as it should be,
since this pair of dialogues-perhaps more than any others in
the Platonic corpus-is directed to the general public. One dialogue shows Socrates speaking to the Athenian people, the
other shows him providing Crito arguments that he, Crito, can
make in explaining to others in Athens why he had not been
able to use his money to secure his friend's escape.
It is instructive to notice just how the dialogues can be
seen by the public-spirited man of Christian inclinations. It is
instructive, that is, to notice just how the Socratic experience,
as related by Plato, can appear to pious men in the West. The
bearing of all this on Anglo-American constitutional developments can be somewhat more immediate if we consider what is
made of Socrates by the great English-speaking champion of
ordered liberty, John Milton (the author of, among other
things, the Areopagitica). Particularly instructive is the ambiguous status of Socrates in Milton's epic poem, Paradise
Regained. This ambiguity reflects not only the natural tension
between religion and philosophy but also the related tension
between the citizen and the human being.
Most of ParadiseRegained-the sequel to ParadiseLost,
in which Adam and Eve had been tempted by Satan to their
mortal doom-is devoted to the temptations of Jesus by Satan,
temptations which are stoutly resisted by Jesus to the ultimate
salvation of mankind. We see, in Book III, the efforts by Satan
"to awaken in Jesus a passion for glory, by particularizing various instances of conquests achieved, and great actions performed, by persons at an early period of life." Jesus replies by
showing the vanity of worldly fame, and the improper means
by which it is generally attained; and contrasts with it the true
glory of religious patience and virtuous wisdom, as exemplified
in the character of Job. Thus, he says (P.R., III, 88-95),
But if there be in glory aught of good,
It may by means far different be attain'd,
Without ambition, war, or violence;
By deeds of peace, by wisdom eminent,
By patience, temperance; I mention still
Him, whom thy wrongs with faintly patience borne,
Made famous in a Land and times obscure;
Who names not now with honor patient Job?
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Jesus then adds, in this reply by him to Satan's temptation
(P.R., III, 96-99):
Poor Socrates (who next more memorable?)
By what he taught and suffer'd for so doing,
For truth's sake suffering death unjust, lives now
Equal in fame to proudest Conquerors.
In Book IV, the Tempter, proposing to Jesus the intellectual gratifications of wisdom and knowledge, points out to him
the celebrated seat of ancient learning, Athens, with its musicians, poets, orators, and philosophers of the different sects.
Satan's tempting description of philosophy hearkens back to,
and tries to exploit, what Jesus had said about Socrates in
Book III (P.R., IV, 272-280):
To sage Philosophy next lend thine ear,
From Heaven descended to the low-rooft house
Of Socrates, see there his Tenement,
Whom well inspir'd the Oracle pronounc'd
Wisest of men; from whose mouth issued forth
Mellifluous streams that water'd all the schools
Of Academics old and new, with those
Surnam'd Peripatetics,and the sect
Epicurean, and the Stoic severe ...

Thus, Satan is displayed as aware not only of the Socratic
source for the various schools of philosophy but also of what
those various schools consist of. (One must wonder how much
Satan can truly be aware of, especially anyone who holds with
Socrates that vice is the result of ignorance.) There then follows, upon Satan's display of the intellectual treasures of
ancient Athens, this "sage" reply by Jesus (P.R., IV, 286-292):
Think not but that I know these things, or think
I know them not; not therefore am I short
Of knowing what I ought: he who receives
Light from above, from the fountain of light,
No other doctrine needs, though granted true;
But these are false, or little else but dreams,
Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm.
Notice that whoever "receives/Light from above, from the
fountain of light,/No other doctrine needs." That is a sufficient reply to Satan. But there follows upon this a critique by
Jesus of the various schools of philosophy, a critique which is

1987]

Appendix A: The Foundersof Our Founders

533

preceded by a tacit exemption for the Socrates who had earlier
been extolled by Jesus (P.R., IV, 293-294):
The first and wisest of them all profess'd
To know this only, that he nothing knew...
Presumably, it is Socrates' insistence upon this truth-that he
recognized the limits of his, and consequently other men's
knowledge-which led to his fate as one who "For truth's sake
suffer[ed] death" (P.R., III, 98).
The Socratic insistence is taken to repudiate worldly wisdom, thereby pointing up the need in men, even in the wisest
of men, for "Light from above, from the fountain of light"
(P.R., IV, 289). Indeed, one might add, what makes Socrates
particularly noteworthy from the perspective of the Christian
writer may be that he suffered for the sake of the truth, more
than the truth for which he happened to suffer. Certainly,
there seems a tension in Milton's poem between respect for
Socrates, the sufferer for the sake of truth, and suspicion of
the philosophers emanating from Socrates, philosophers who
consider natural reason sufficient, to say nothing of those who
more directly threaten the faith men have in illumination
"from above." Such threateners, it would seem, are as vulnerable to the armed guardians of received doctrines as the Socratic
way of life itself was before it came to be invested with the
respect for divinity provided it by Plato. (Plutarch's Nicias is
instructive here.) Thus, there seems to have been both in
pagan times and in Christian times tension, if not even a necessary conflict, between philosophy and an established religious
life.
Jesus is presented in ParadiseRegained as decisively repudiating the schools derived from Socrates. These successive
repudiations, which themselves draw upon perceptive characterizations of each school, address themselves, in turn, to Socrates himself (as we have seen), to Plato, to the Skeptics, to
the Aristotelians, to Epicurus, and to the Stoics (P.R., IV, 293308):
The first and wisest of them all profess'd
To know this only, that he nothing knew;
The next to fabling fell, and smooth conceits;
A third sort doubted all things, though plain sense;
Others in virtue plac'd felicity,
But virtue join'd with riches and long life;
In corporal pleasure he, and careless ease;
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The Stoic last in Philosophic pride,
By him call'd virtue; and his virtuous man,
Wise, perfect in himself, and all possessing
Equal to God, oft shames not to prefer,
As fearing God nor man, contemning all
Wealth, pleasure, pain or torment, death and life,
Which when he lists, he leaves, or boasts he can,
For all his tedious talk is but vain boast,
Or subtle shifts conviction to evade.
It might be noted in passing that the Stoics are considered at
greater length than the others, perhaps because they resembled in some ways the Christians themselves.
Jesus is then shown dismissing all the philosophers with
criticisms that the philosophers' more pious-patriotic critics in
Athens (and later, in Rome) might also have applied to them
(P.R., IV, 309-330):
Alas! what can they teach, and not mislead;
Ignorant of themselves, of God much more,
And how the world began, and how man fell
Degraded by himself, on grace depending?
Much of the Soul they talk, but all awry,
And in themselves seek virtue, and to themselves
All glory arrogate, to God give none,
Rather accuse him under usual names,
Fortune and Fate, as one regardless quite
Of mortal things. Who therefore seeks in these
True wisdom, finds her not, or by delusion
Far worse, her false resemblance only meets,
An empty cloud. However, many books
Wise men have said are wearisome; who reads
Incessantly, and to his reading brings not
A spirit and judgment equal or superior
(And what he brings, what needs he elsewhere seek)
Uncertain and unsettl'd still remains,
Deep verst in books and shallow in himself,
Crude or intoxicate, collecting toys,
And trifles for choice matters, worth a sponge;
As Children gathering pebbles on the shore.
Notice the question that is posed about the advisability of
any reading at all in the books of these worldly men. The
reader remains "uncertain and unsettl'd," no matter how much
he reads, unless he brings to that reading a "spirit and judgment equal or superior"-and, it is asked, if he already has
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that spirit and judgment to bring to his reading of the philosophers, "what needs he elsewhere seek"? Thus, the self-sufficiency, both for understanding and for a virtuous life, of the
doctrines of true religion, is insisted upon. On the other hand,
the philosopher, who cannot help but be somewhat skeptical
even when he is not something of a materialist, poses a constant threat to the good order of the community. That is to
say, we again see that the civic vulnerability of Socrates was
not accidental.
Of course, Socrates himself can be understood to have
tried to refine and otherwise to correct religious opinions
which had become all too questionable and which, consequently, were doomed to fall before the criticisms of others
who would not be as responsible as he was in reforming them.
On the other hand, Jesus is presented as rooted in religious
doctrines and institutions which provide men all they need,
thereby making superfluous for them the arts and sciences of
ancient Athens. Thus, Jesus says to the Tempter (P.R., IV,
331-364),
Or if I would delight my private hours
With Music or with Poem, where so soon
As in our native Language can I find
That solace? All our Law and Story strew'd
With Hymns, our Psalms with artful terms inscrib'd
Our Hebrew Songs and Harps in Babylon,
That pleas'd so well our Victor's ear, declare
That rather Greece from us these arts deriv'd;
Ill imitated, while they loudest sing
The vices of their Deities, and their own
In Fable, Hymn, or Song, so personating
Their Gods ridiculous, and themselves past shame.
Remove their swelling Epithets thick laid
As varnish on a Harlot's cheek, the rest,
Thin sown with aught of profit or delight,
Will far be found unworthy to compare
With Sion's songs, to all true tastes excelling
Where God is prais'd aright, and Godlike men,
The Holiest of Holies, and his Saints;
Such are from God inspir'd, not such from thee;
Unless where moral virtue is express'd
By light of Nature, not in all quite lost.
Their Orators thou then extoll'st, as those
The top of Eloquence; Statists indeed,
And lovers of their Country, as may seem;
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But herein to our Prophets far beneath,
As men divinely taught, and better teaching
The solid rules of Civil Government
In their majestic unaffected style
Than all the Oratory of Greece and Rome.
In them is plainest taught, and easiest learnt,
What makes a Nation happy, and keeps it so,
What ruins Kingdoms, and lays Cities flat;
These only, with our Law, best form a King.
A double claim seems to be made here, that the stories told
among the Jews (and, it would seem, among the Christians-tobe) about the divine are sounder than those told by the Greeks;
also, that "our law" provides a better basis for statecraft and
hence for the happiness of nations than what came out of
Greece and Rome. That is to say, "our" way is held out as
being both more true and more salutary.
Certain of the philosophers might have been inclined to
ask whether that which is not true may nevertheless be
employed by conscientious men in the promotion of that which
is salutary. Indeed, they might even have been inclined to suggest (in language later used by George Washington) that
whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience
both forbid us to expect most people to be moved with respect
to matters divine by anything more reliable than noble fables,
so much so that even when the truth is presented to them
about such matters, they can receive them with no other or
with no more assurance than that which others like them in
other times have received what is now recognized to have been
error. Or, put another way, did not Plato himself know that he
"to fabling fell, and smooth conceits"? (P.R., IV, 295) And if so,
how did he justify it?
We are warned, as we have seen, against "Philosophic
pride" (P.R., IV, 300). This seems to be something that philosophers are easily believed to indulge themselves in, Socrates not
the least in this respect (despite the characterization of him in
Milton's poem as "Poor Socrates," as one who had "for truth's
sake suffer[ed] death," as one who knew only "that he nothing
knew." (P.R., III, 96-97, IV, 294. See, also, the opening pages of
Halevi's Kuzari.) One truth that Socrates did know, and for
which he suffered, was that he was markedly superior to most
people he had come to know. His unwillingness, or inability, to
conceal this truth from others finally contributed to his death
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at the hands of his fellow-citizens. But in thus arriving at that
truth, and at other truths upon which this fatal truth rested
and to which it leads, Socrates did achieve that fulfillment as a
human being-that profound moral and intellectual development of embodied reason-to which all citizens, whether they
know it or not, can be understood to have dedicated their communal life. Indeed, it may well be that it is because citizens
have such an implicit dedication that they can act as they do
against anyone who is perceived to be threatening the received
and cherished opinions (religious and otherwise) upon which
virtue and the meaningfulness of things depend.
IV.
Socrates, we have noticed, does not seem to have been of
the opinion that what he happened to be capable of, many
others would be likely to achieve as well. What the community is and is not capable of is suggested by the Apology and
the Crito, that pair of dialogues provided by Plato for the training of the general public.
What, then, is the teaching of these dialogues which can be
said to bear on our constitutional development? That teaching
takes men much as they are: it points to the best possible
regime (which is transitory), not to an "ideal" regime. An
ideal regime may be seen in the Christian Paradise. The ideal
may be realized there, with a redeemed or transformed human
nature: from that something permanent or eternal can be
expected. Consider how that transformation is celebrated, as
Jesus is honored by angels after his triumph over the Tempter
(P.R., IV, 606-617):
[N]ow thou hast aveng'd
Supplanted Adam, and by vanquishing
Temptation, hast regain'd lost Paradise,
And frustrated the conquest fraudulent:
He never more henceforth will dare set foot
in Paradise to tempt; his snares are broke:
For, though that seat of earthly bliss be fail'd,
A fairer Paradise is founded now
For Adam and his chosen Sons, whom thou
A Savior art come down to reinstall,
Where they shall dwell secure, when time shall be
Of Tempter and Temptation without fear.
The devout Christian is transformed, it would seem, in antici-
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pation of his Heavenly condition-and this is transformation
into a state far superior to anything mere reason can provide
man. It is available, furthermore, for anyone who will believe.
Socrates, on the other hand, assumes that most people will
continue to be much as they are. How are they? They are susceptible to prejudice and envy; they are incapable of understanding much, which makes the reputations assigned to men
rather suspect; they are much more interested in survival and
self-gratification than they are in virtue. One consequence of
all this is that it is dangerous for the thoughtful man, at least
in the ordinary regime, to go into political life: he is not apt to
last long, thereby being of little use either to himself or to
others.
There is also a certain inevitable folly to political life, if
only because would-be leaders (who must try, as they become
more and more "successful," to anticipate and regulate the
doings of more and more people) find it difficult really to
know what is going on. Consider a prosaic illustration I draw
from an occasion in April 1973 when a half dozen of us, of different political inclinations and of considerable interest in politics (including several political scientists), predicted who would
be the Presidential candidates of the major parties in 1976.
Although this was only three years ago, none of us happened
upon any man who was nominated this past summer for either
President or Vice-President by any political party! It is difficult to lead a meaningful life in politics partly because it is all
too often next to impossible to plan sensibly for oneself even in
"the short run."
The role of chance in politics is all too evident to the
thoughtful man-and this cannot help but curtail his interest
in it. This is not to say, however, that there are no enduring
standards which apply to what one should or should not do,
either in public life or in response to the demands of politicians. It is evident that Socrates believed there are such standards-and that they very much bear on what the best possible
regime is like. There are standards which make far less of the
threat or possibility of death than most people are apt to do.
Thus, Socrates is shown in both the Apology and the Crito as
relatively unaffected by the prospect of death. Indeed, he can
even wonder whether life is better than death. Certainly,
according to him, a vicious life is worse than death. Certainly,
also, there is not in him the concern about death that is evi-
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dent in the designation, by God Himself, of Sin and Death as
"the two grand foes" (P.R., I, 159).
Socrates may well see sin-or rather, the ignorance from
which vice follows-as the grand foe of mankind. The typical
city, on the other hand, sees death as the evil especially to be
guarded against-and much of what it does and says takes that
for granted (including its usual alliance with religion). But
then, the typical city-and hence the typical citizen-is a prisoner of unexamined habits and distorted opinions.
Even in the best possible city, there would be a necessity
to distinguish between the few who understand and the many
who have no more than sound opinions. For these many,
poetry (including religious prophecy) is necessary for a decent
life. That is to say, the limitations of human nature must be
taken into account; the distribution of talents and differences
in temperament, however mitigated by efforts to control both
breeding and nurture, very much affect what can be done to
develop and preserve a just order, especially an order which
permits that philosophic life to which the city is somehow dedicated and in which all can be said somehow to participate.
The philosopher, on the other hand, recognizes his need
for the city and the duties consequent upon that need. He recognizes also that there are better cities and worse, useful institutions and harmful ones.
V.
No doubt, chance developments (including the emergence
of gifted men as founders) can determine whether a city is
blessed with institutions that promote moral virtue and permit
intellectual virtue. We can see in the Apology and the Crito
various duties, standards and institutions deemed by Socrates
to contribute to the perpetuation of decent cities. Some I have
already touched upon. We need to do little more, in this effort
to indicate how the Platonic dialogues bear on our constitutional development, than notice a few of the suggestions Socrates made. Many of these suggestions, which affect our notions
of what a humane regime is like, we now take for grantedeven though there are many peoples in the world today who
have never enjoyed them. One major objective of these suggestions is to develop a city which, even while it insists upon its
necessary prerogatives, is aware of its limitations-and con-
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ducts itself accordingly. Some Socratic suggestions, as evident
in the Apology and the Crito, follow:
There is no question, first of all, but that the city should
be concerned with those opinions of citizens which bear upon
morality and citizenship, and these include opinions about the
divine and about the condition of the soul after death. Thus,
the education of the young and some lifelong supervision of all
citizens with respect to these matters are called for, as are
efforts to suppress corrupting influences and to promote those
influences which make or keep men good. For this nurture
and care, something is due in return.
So, next (in this list of Socratic suggestions about the
proper ordering of cities), the citizen has a variety of duties,
including military service in distant lands and civic service at
home. This does not mean, however, that one is obliged, as a
soldier or as a civilian, to do everything one is ordered to do.
Thus, we learn of Socrates' refusal to comply with orders
which would have had him perform unjust acts in Athens.
Would he not have responded the same way to a clearly unjust
war abroad? But whatever one's duties with respect to military or civic service, there are all too often moral ambiguities
which may keep a sensible man from volunteering for either.
Next, we can see that the city, too, has duties which can be
translated into various rights of citizens. That is, the city
should conduct itself in certain ways in exercising the considerable power with which it is entrusted. Thus, orderly procedure
is called for in trials; time for careful deliberation should be
provided; cross-examination of accusers and witnesses is taken
for granted. It also seems to be taken for granted in much of
what Socrates says in the Apology and the Crito that the rule
of law should be relied upon-and this means that laws should
be clear and known in advance, that citizens should have an
opportunity to criticize them, and that there should be means
for having them changed. (Something of what we know as
freedom of speech is implied.) That is to say, the laws which
call upon citizens to respect them should themselves measure
up to reasonable standards of conduct.
Central to the constitutional arrangements and laws that
any city may have are those which attempt to deal with the
opinions of citizens and others about how the whole of things
is to be understood. That is, there should be authoritative customs with respect to impiety (and disloyalty); but these cus-
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toms and laws should not, in their application, destroy the
occasional Socrates. Certainly, considerable tolerance for conscientious, even though sometimes mistaken, dissent, is sensible. But a city does need to stand for something, even as it
allows people such as Socrates to challenge an often mistaken
public opinion.
Next, the city must permit those who are not under indictment to leave whenever they wish to do so. Those who
remain, when they have the privilege of emigration, imply that
they are willing to abide by the laws of the city--and that they
are willing to be judged and punished according to those laws.
On the other hand, the city which recognizes that dissatisfied
citizens may leave is much more likely to restrain itself than is
one which erects a Berlin Wall. Of course, tyrannies will arise
from time to time (including those which do not allow free
movement in or out)--and these, it would seem, may be overthrown. Indeed, the standards of justice which exist independently of regimes provide a basis for judging all regimes-and
may be seen in the right of revolution, rooted in nature, found
in the Declaration of Independence. This can usefully be
understood as a natural-right legacy of the Socratic assessment
of the regimes of his day; it complements his salutary stand for
law-abidingness even in the face of death.
Next, private property is taken for granted. Should it not
be understood to extend not only to physical possessions but
also to family associations? The importance of property is
reflected in the privilege of emigration, for that privilege
includes the right to take with one whatever is one's own. Of
course, what is one's own-whether possessions or relativesdoes depend in large part upon what the laws have provided
for, such laws as those regulating various marriages, estates
and burials. Of course, also, there are in Socrates' opinion
things more important than property, as property is ordinarily
understood. Even so, property does reaffirm the importance of
one's own-and may even move the thoughtful man to consider what should truly be one's own. Certainly, there is something reassuring about private associations and about the
useful friendships that property make possible: people can
vouch for, and protect (and in the best cases elevate), one
another. Certainly, also, property means leisure-and that can
mean the proper cultivation of one's soul. Or, as Milton's
Jesus says of the Aristotelians, "[They] in virtue plac'd felic-
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ity,/But virtue join'd with riches and long life." (P.R., IV, 297298)
Finally, in this catalogue of suggestions drawn from the
Apology and Crito about the ordering of cities, there are the
implications of Socrates' modest proposal that the most fitting
"punishment" for him, as one who has neglected his own fortunes in his tireless advancement of the common good, would
be to be maintained in the Prytanean for the rest of his life at
public expense. A well-ordered city, he seems to say, is one
which has been able to work its way to sound judgments in
these matters: it is somehow aware of what cities are really for
and how someone such as Socrates contributes to the very best
a city can aspire to.
In the well-ordered city, names (as well as property and
honors) are distributed properly; for example, those who judge
justly are truly called "judges." That is, in such a city, those
who shape the authoritative opinions of the community know
what they are talking about. In such a city, it is recognized (if
only tacitly) that a certain flowering of the human spirit, even
though it can be manifested in only a few at a time, is the city's
ultimate reason for being-and this flowering includes a constant effort to determine the truth about things, including
about what divinity is like and what happens to the soul upon
death.
This effort, it should at once be added, is consistent with
"fabling ... and smooth conceits" (P.R., IV, 295), lest the dis-

coveries that a few are privileged to make should be harmful
to the many who provide the social support for such discoveries and who (for one reason or another) may not be able to
understand them properly. Indeed, the two dialogues we have
had under consideration contributed to Plato's deliberate
efforts to make "Philosophic pride" (P.R., IV, 300) socially
acceptable thereafter-to establish a place in the community
for the occasional man who, for good reason, may be more a
human being than a citizen.
VI.
We return now, after this survey of some of the influences
upon our constitutional development which can be traced back
to dialogues such as the Apology and the Crito, to that other
great set of influences-to the Biblical, and specifically to the
Christian, influences-on our way of life. Those influences,
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which have been evident in what I have said about Jesus'
response to philosophy in Paradise Regained, are apparent
even in skeptical times. Some of those influences are of the
sort that other religions would exert also, since all serious religions dictate moral conduct and provide social restraints. Various Biblical influences may be seen among us in the
Mayflower Compact, in the Gettysburg Address and even in
that noble product of a somewhat rationalistic age, the Declaration of Independence.
The religion of a people provides the "philosophical" setting for that people's political and legal arrangements. It looks
beyond (or provides a foundation for) the life of the city (even
when the "separation of Church and State" is religiously
insisted upon). Thus, a moral influence is exerted, both with
instruction in what is right and wrong and with forecasts of
what rewards and punishments can be expected and when.
For these purposes, there can be quite specific rules of conduct
about such matters as diet, marriage and worship. Thus, also, a
sense of purpose for the community, and for human life itself,
is provided. Things are made meaningful; life is depicted as
rich, or at least as significant, not as sterile, empty, hopeless.
Limits to temporal authority are suggested whenever a
concern for the soul is put before a concern for the body with
the body's natural appetite for mere survival and for sensual
gratification. Indeed, concern for the soul-for the proper
ordering of the soul-can be taken in some circumstances to
authorize resistance to temporal authority; and it can, for better as well as for worse, inhibit political activity.
Those bound to particular religious sects are citizens of
those "principalities or republics." They are different in their
citizenships, one from another, according to the particular sects
they are associated with. On the other hand, educated human
beings, insofar as they are not bound by such allegiances, tend
to be like one another. But it should be recognized that most
men do need particular associations, religious as well as political. One can even say that religion (or certain kinds of patriotism) can do for the many something of what philosophy does
for a few.
But there is a critical distinction between religion and philosophy which should be of enduring significance for us: the
salutary moral concerns of citizenship (religious as well as
political) do tend to be pressed at the expense of genuine
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inquiry. And that is, as we have seen, why Socrates was inevitably vulnerable. True, he was not prosecuted until his old
age; but he had been placed under clouds for decades, by public
opinion, as someone who had gone his own way, a threat to the
associations which most men naturally hold dear.
VII.
But whatever the ancient quarrel between the Socratic
way of life and the religious-political way of life-between,
that is, the human being and the city, between (in a different
form) philosophy and poetry-both ways of life are vulnerable
today. These two ways of life have, in the face of certain modern developments, more in common than they have dividing
them. Indeed, one can argue that only within the social context provided by a decent religious faith is a thoughtful philosophical effort likely to maintain itself. Perhaps this has
always been true-but it seems particularly apparent today.
Religious faiths are peculiarly vulnerable at the hands of
intellectuals-that is, at the hands of those who have inherited
from the philosophers an openness to inquiry but not a recognition of the need for self-restraint. Openness usually sounds
more alluring than self-restraint. Self-restraint-a salutary
restraint which takes account not only of one's vulnerability
but also of the needs of others-may be seen in the deeper
meanings of the Apology and the Crito, and I suspect in the
deeper reaches of Milton's great religious poems as well.
Explicit examinations of such further teachings must be
reserved for an appropriate occasion.
I have been concerned on this occasion with the landscape
(or surface meanings) of these works, with a view to indicating
some of the influences of Jerusalem and of Athens upon
American constitutional developments. These have been, I
have suggested, sometimes conflicting influences.
One set of influences, associated more with the interests of
the citizen, makes for piety and hence stability; the other, associated more with the interests of the human being, makes for
speculation and hence change. One can degenerate into either
stultification or harshness, the other into either irrelevance or
irresponsibility. How to combine properly these divergent
influences is the work of either the truly inspired prophet or
the inspiringly prudent statesman.
In any event, it should be noticed that both Jerusalem and
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Athens stress something which is critical to American constitutionalism, the necessity of returning again and again to authoritative texts for guidance.
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APPENDIX B
32
JUSTICE IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC
OF
THE AMBIGUITY
That which gives to human Actions the relish of Justice is a
certain Noblenesse or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely
found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life to fraud or breach of promise.
-Thomas

Hobbes, Leviathan,
Chap. 15

I.
The oddness of the passage in Book IV of Plato's Republic
where the virtue of justice is hunted down (Rep. 432B sq.) has
been noticed in this fashion by Leo Strauss in his City and
Man (at pp. 105-106):
After the founding of the good city is completed, Socrates and his friends turn to seeking where in it are justice and
injustice and whether the man who is to be happy must possess justice or injustice. They surely succeed in stating what
justice is. This is perhaps the strangest happening in the
whole Republic. That Platonic dialogue which is devoted to
the subject of justice answers the question of what justice is
long before the first half of the work is finished, long before
the most important facts without the consideration of which
the essense of justice cannot be possibly determined in an
adequate manner, have come to light, let alone have been
duly considered. No wonder that the definition of justice at
which the Republic arrives determines at most the genus to
which justice belongs but not its specific difference (cf.
433a3). One cannot help contrasting the Republic with the
other dialogues which raise the question of what a given virtue is; those other dialogues do not answer the question with
which they deal; they are aporetic dialogues. The Republic
appears to be a dialogue in which the truth is declared, a
dogmatic dialogue. But since that truth is set forth on the
basis of strikingly deficient evidence, one is compelled to say
that the Republic is in fact as aporetic as the so-called
aporetic dialogues. Why did Plato proceed in this manner in
32. A talk given by George Anastaplo at a staff meeting of the Basic Program of
Liberal Education for Adults, The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, February
22, 1987. The quotations from PLATo's REPUBLIC (cited as Rep. in the text) are taken

from the Allan Bloom translation (in the Basic Books edition). (At the author's
request, the footnotes are contained in the text and hence cannot conform to "Blue
Book" style. -The Editors]
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the dialogue treating justice as distinguished from the dialogues treating the other virtues? Justice, we may say, is the
universal virtue, the virtue most obviously related to the
city. The theme of the Republic is political in more than one
sense, and the political questions of great urgency do not
permit delay: the question of justice must be answered by
all means even if all the evidence needed for an adequate
answer is not yet in....
I am particularly interested on this occasion in the description of the hunting down of justice, with the discovery of this
virtue as lurking "from the beginning" in obscurity underfoot.
How is this to be understood? The passage begins this way
(Rep. 432B-433D):
"All right," I [Socrates] said. "Three [forms of virtuecourage, prudence and moderation] have been spied out in
our city, at least sufficiently to form some opinion. Now
what would be the remaining form thanks to which the city
would further partake in virtue? For, plainly, this is
justice."
"Plainly."
"So then, Glaucon, we must, like hunters, now station
ourselves in a circle around the thicket and pay attention so
that justice doesn't slip through somewhere and disappear
into obscurity. Clearly, it's somewhere hereabouts. Look to
it and make every effort to catch sight of it; you might somehow see it before me and could tell me."
"If only I could," he said. "However, if you use me as a
follower and a man able to see what's shown him, you'll be
making quite sensible use of me."
"Follow," I said, "and pray with me."
"I'll do that," he said, "just lead."
"The place really appears to be hard going and steeped
in shadows," I said. "At least it's dark and hard to search
out. But, all the same, we've got to go on."
"Yes," he said, "we've got to go on."
And I caught sight of it and said, "Here! Here! Glaucon.
Maybe we've come upon a track; and, in my opinion, it will
hardly get away from us."
"That's good news you report," he said.
"My, my," I said, "that was a stupid state we were in."
"How's that?"
"It appears, you blessed man, that it's been rolling
around at our feet from the beginning and we couldn't see it
after all, but were quite ridiculous. As men holding some-
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thing in their hand sometimes seek what they're holding, we
too didn't look at it but turned our gaze somewhere far off,
which is also perhaps just the reason it escaped our notice."
"How do you mean?" he said.
"It's this way," I said. "In my opinion, we have been
saying and hearing it all along without learning from ourselves that we were in a way saying it."
"A long prelude," he said, "for one who desires to hear."
"Listen whether after all I make any sense," I said.
"That rule we set down at the beginning as to what must be
done in everything when we were founding the city-this, or
a certain form of it, is, in my opinion, justice. Surely we set
down and often said, if you remember, that each one must
practice one of the functions in the city, that one for which
his nature made him naturally most fit."
"Yes, we were saying that."
"And further, that justice is the minding of one's own
business and not being a busybody, this we have both heard
from many others and have often said ourselves."
"Yes, we have."
"Well, then, my friend," I said, "this-the practice of
minding one's own business-when it comes into being a certain way, is probably justice. Do you know how I infer
this?"
"No," he said, "tell me."
"In my opinion," I said, "after having considered moderation, courage, and prudence, this is what's left over in the
city; it provided the power by which all these others came
into being; and, once having come into being, it provides
them with preservation as long as it's in the city. And yet
we were saying that justice would be what's left over from
the three if we found them."
"Yes, we did," he said, "and it's necessarily so."
"Moreover," I said, "if one had to judge which of them
by coming to be will do our city the most good, it would be a
difficult judgment. Is it the unity of opinion among rulers
and ruled? [Moderation] Or is it the coming into being in
the soldiers of that preserving of the lawful opinion as to
which things are terrible and which are not? [Courage] Or is
it the prudence and guardianship present in the rulers?
[Wisdom] Or is the city done the most good by the fact
that-in the case of child, woman, slave, freeman, craftsman,
ruler and ruled--each one minded his own business and
wasn't a busybody? [Justice]
"It would, of course," he said, "be a difficult judgment."
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"Then, as it seems, with respect to a city's virtue, this
power that consists in each man's minding his own business
in the city is a rival to wisdom, moderation and courage."
"Very much so," he said.
I have long wondered about this passage, especially about
the condition and location of justice. I now attempt to suggest
how one might begin to think about the place of justice in the
Republic.
II.
One massive fact about the Republic should be noticed at
the outset-and that is that hundreds of pages of dialogue are
required to establish that justice is choiceworthy for its own
sake. (Serious questions remain, of course, whether this is
truly established.) Justice, it is evident, is quite different in
this respect from "wisdom, moderation, and courage," each of
which can be fairly easily shown to be worth having for itself
alone, aside from considerations either of reputation or of the
responses by others.
It is said in the dialogue that the intrinsic choiceworthiness of justice had never been established before (See Rep.
358C-D, 366D-E.) The problem with justice is reflected in the
fact that, first, Thrasymachus, and then Glaucon and Adeimantus, can make the powerful arguments they do against justice
(as commonly understood) being desirable for its own sake,
aside from the opinions of others.
Everyone knows that justice is intimately related to the
uses and effects of laws. (The Laws of Plato, too, has to be a
quite long dialogue.) Laws, we also know, vary from place to
place, from time to time; it is not difficult to see that they
often serve the interests of rulers. (See, e.g., Rep. 338C, 339A.)
We know as well that laws very much depend upon force and
that fact can be troublesome. The prospect of the use of force
in the organization of a community may even be seen in the
"argument" resorted to in the opening lines of the Republic,
when Polemarchus "threatens" to compel Socrates and an alltoo-willing Glaucon to remain in Piraeus for the evening's festivities. Thus, there is something compulsory in the "founding" of the community from which this great conversation
emerges. It is hard to deny that this threatened recourse to
violence was most salutary and, in more than one way, in the
interest of justice.
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III.
I count some seven hundred uses of one form or another
of the term dikaiosyne in the Republic. There are three principal clusters in the uses of words of this family (which
include, in almost one-half of the instances, references in the
dialogue to "injustice" and "unjust"). The first, and by far the
largest, cluster is in Book I and the first part of Book II (with
two-thirds of the total uses in the first seventh of the dialogue). The second cluster (about one-tenth of the total uses)
is in Book IV, part of which I have quoted. The third cluster
(another one-tenth) is at the end of the dialogue, in the closing
pages of Book X. I draw upon each of these clusters in my
remarks on this occasion.
We have seen that when justice is hunted down, in Book
IV, it turns out to have been there all along: in fact, it had
been used in the very construction of the city from the outset.
Such use is reflected in the routine division of labor, which is
obviously advantageous in everyday life. (This suggests that
the utility of "justice" is apparent to common sense.)
It is said that the city has its origins in need. (Rep. 369B)
At the inception of Socrates' city-building, the allocation of
tasks and duties according to people's natural capacities is
made explicit. (Rep. 369A sq.) This mode of allocation is again
and again referred to thereafter. (See, e.g., Rep. 433A, 443B-C.)
This principle had been anticipated during Socrates' exchange
with Polemarchus, when the specialized virtue of the pruning
knife had been recognized. (Rep. 333D)
Thus, justice is natural for men to rely upon. And yet it
can be obscure, or difficult to locate and to justify, with its
questionableness indicated in the fact that justice can be called
another's good. (Rep. 343C, 367C)
IV.
We have noticed that the other three principal virtues are
much more readily identified and justified. Why is justice so
hard to come by?
Although justice is naturally useful for a community, it
can still be said of this virtue that it was providential that it
had been relied upon in the founding of Socrates' city. (Rep.
443B: "through some god") Where some might say "providence," others might say "nature" or "chance." Certainly,
there is something accidental (at least in appearance) in the
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way justice comes into this conversation, for it is introduced
not by Socrates but by Cephalos. (Rep. 330D)
There are four uses of "unjust" by Cephalos before he
makes his single use of "just"-and his single use comes only
when he draws upon lines from Pindar. Cephalos, it can be
said, is primarily concerned to avoid the consequences (particularly the personal consequences after death) of one's injustice;
he is not moved primarily by justice itself. That is, he is not
drawn to justice for its own sake. His repeated sacrifices to the
gods are designed to serve him in that hereafter which he, as a
"very old" man, recognizes is for him near at hand. (See Rep.
328C, 331D.)
Socrates, too, draws five times upon some form of "justice"
in his exchange with Cephalos: but Socrates reverses
Cephalos' distribution, using "just" (or "justice") four times to
one use of "unjust." Socrates, we come to see, is more interested than is Cephalos in justice itself, singling out that term
from the speeches of Cephalos-and the great conversation we
do have can thereafter be generated. (Polemarchus [War Lord]
is not altogether his father's son: he never uses "unjust" in his
five uses of some form of "justice." There are in the SocratesPolemarchus exchanges two dozen uses of "just" before the
first use of "unjust." Should not the military-minded be
exposed mostly to justice if they are to be reliable?) But however interested Socrates may appear to be in justice on this
occasion, we also come to see that neither justice nor the political life dedicated to justice is ultimately what moves him.
V.
Scoundrels, we are reminded, are obliged to observe some
semblance of justice among them if they are to maintain a
profitable association. (See Rep. 351C-D, 352C.) Since they
want to avoid the disruptive consequences of injustice, they are
obliged to be, or at least to appear to be, not unjust to one
another. Instinct, or a kind of shrewdness, seems to be at work
here. Is there not something of this, also, in Cephalos' pious
respect for justice?
Even the bold Thrasymachus shrinks from calling justice a
vice; rather, he concedes, it is high-minded innocence. (Rep.
348C. See Rep. 409A-B.) This reflects the fact that justice is
invoked all the time, that the appearance of it is powerful, that
people somehow respect it (even though they might personally
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subvert it clandestinely when they believe they can safely do
so). (See, e.g., Rep. 361A.)
VI.
All this points up the problem put by Glaucon, a problem
that we now tend to associate with Immanuel Kant: is justice
choiceworthy for its own sake? (See, e.g., Rep. 361B-C.) What
would be needed truly to establish that? Or is this too much to
ask for, especially since this is the most social of the principal
virtues? Is an emphasis upon justice only for its own sake
likely to distort justice itself, partly because it discourages use
of that prudential judgment which helps determine what
should be done in varying circumstances?
In any event, we know that Kant wants justice to be
aboveboard and splendid, not something underfoot and
obscure. Certainly, any reliance upon deception and subterfuge is condemned by him. Compare the necessary recourse to
noble lies that Socrates takes for granted. (See, e.g., Rep. 414B415D.)
Less prosaic than justice is the moderation that Socrates
describes: moderation manifests, in its harmonizing aspect, the
elevated features we commonly associate with justice. (See
Rep.431E-432B.) Perhaps this helps explain why Socrates
wanted to skip dealing with moderation (430D); it can make
justice (at least as defined in the Republic) seem rather drab
by comparison.
VII.
Something of the Kantian splendor of justice may be seen
in the closing references to justice in the Republic, both in the
Myth of Er (at the very end of the dialogue) and in the passage
just before that Myth is resorted to.
Socrates (in an exchange with Glaucon) describes what
happens, or at least what is most likely to happen, to both the
just man and the unjust man toward the end of their respective lives, however much each of them had been long misjudged by the community (Rep. 613B-614A):
"... . Don't the clever unjust men do exactly as do all

those in a race who run well from the lower end of the
course but not from the upper? At the start they leap
sharply away but end up by becoming ridiculous and, with
their ears on their shoulders, run off uncrowned? But those
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who are truly runners come to the end, take the prizes, and
are crowned. Doesn't it also for the most part turn out that
way with the just? Toward the end of every action, association, and life they get a good reputation and bear off the
prizes from human beings."
"Quite so."
"Will you, then, stand for my saying about them what
you yourself have said about the unjust? For I shall say that
it's precisely the just, when they get older, who rule in their
city if they wish ruling offices, and marry wherever they
wish and give in marriage to whomever they want. And
everything you said about the unjust, I now say about these
men. And, again, about the unjust, I shall say that most of
them, even if they get away unnoticed when they are young,
are caught at the end of the race and ridiculed; and when
they get old, they are insulted in their wretchedness by foreigners and townsmen. As for being whipped and the things
that you, speaking truly, said are rustic-that they will be
racked and burned-suppose that you have also heard from
me that they suffer all these things. But, as I say, see if
you'll stand for it."
"Very much so," he said. "For what you say is just."
"Well, then," I said, "such would be the prizes, wages,
and gifts coming to the just man while alive from gods and
human beings, in addition to those good things that justice
itself procured."
"And they are," he said, "quite fair and sure ones."
Thus, the just man is shown as finally vindicated, even
here on earth. But are we not meant to remember the fate of
Socrates? Does not what is supposed to happen eventually to
the unjust man sound distressingly like what did happen to
Socrates at the end of his own life? Socrates, in talking at the
outset of the Republic to Cephalos, had said that perhaps he
too would take the road Cephalos had. (Rep. 328C) But the
reader knows that Socrates does not become "very old," something which is further anticipated by Socrates' use of "for the
most part" in the passage I have just quoted.
Of course, the truly philosophical man may not be concerned about such an "accident" as Socrates' earthly fate. (See,
as indicative of what philosophers are like, Rep. 476A, 480A,
494B, 500C. See, on something greater than justice and the
three other virtues, Rep. 504D.) but such lack of concern is
hardly likely to lend much support to a popular argument for
justice as praiseworthy for its own sake.

554

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 10:507

Thus, the Myth of Er may be crucial for the general effect
of the dialogue. Mankind is thereby told of the divergent fates
of the unjust and of the just in the afterlife, which fates seem
to compensate for the things that go wrong here (that is, for
the misallocations of rewards and punishments on earth).
Adeimantus' instinct may have been sound in these matters:
he had insisted upon considering as well the significance of the
afterlife in any proper assessment of justice. The central uses
of "justice" in the dialogue are in the course of his elaboration
(in Book II) of that significance (around Rep. 363D). Even so,
Socrates at the end of the Apology remains uncertain about
whether there is life after death which suggests how he personally regards such things as the Myth of Er.
The Myth of Er is also of use in that it reflects the need to
account for the apparent role of chance in the shaping of men's
lives (as seen in the natural capacities one may have, or in the
circumstances in which one is born, or in the training and
other experiences that happen to be available to one. This
Myth suggests that one's life is truly of one's choosing, leaving
in obscurity the ultimate origins of one's "personal" sequence
of lives and afterlives.
Both of these uses of, if not needs for, the Myth of Er
remain to trouble us about justice, however noble or gallant it
may be for a man to be open to justice without regard for its
demonstrable consequences.
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APPENDIX C
PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC LAW:
33
THE FOUNDERS' PERSPECTIVE
He came here as a Representative of America; he flattered himself he came here in some degree as a Representative of the whole human race; for the whole human race will
be affected by the proceedings of this [Federal] Convention.
He wished gentlemen to extend their views beyond the present moment of time, beyond the narrow limits of place from
which they derive their political origin.
-Gouverneur Morris,
July 5, 1787
I.

Private rights-which may be a refined way of saying,
"self-interest"-private rights are said by some to be at
the
heart of the American regime. If this should be so, how does
having private rights at its core affect the American way of
life? Does it mean that a concern for private rights is critical
to the ends and doings of government and hence to the public
law that is developed? Does it mean that the public, as public,
has no independent status or dignity but only as something
derivative from, and ultimately limited by, private rights and
that looking-inwardness which an emphasis upon private rights
suggests?
The importance of private rights-of the rights of men
prior to or otherwise independent of government-may be
seen in our founding document, the Declaration of Independence. You must all recall those famous sentences in the Declaration of Independence upon which Abraham Lincoln, here
on the plains of Illinois and later in his First Inaugural
Address, grounded his decisive policies some one hundred and
twenty-five years ago:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are life, liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness-That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any
33. A talk given by George Anastaplo at Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois,
April 17, 1983. [At the author's request, the footnotes are contained in the text and
hence cannot conform with "Blue Book" style. -The Editors]
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form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is
the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
It is, we are told, to secure these rights--such rights as
those to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness-it is to
secure these rights that "Governments are instituted among
Men." All are somehow equal: either all are equal and hence
have such rights, or they all have such rights and hence are
equal.
Men, it seems, have such rights prior to, or otherwise
independent of, government: for, we are told, governments are
instituted among men in order to secure these rights. No other
reason, it seems, is as important as this for instituting governments, for judging them once instituted, and for replacing
them when the securing of such rights fails.
We must notice that other reasons have been given by
mankind (including by many Americans) for instituting government: thus it has been said that social relations, and hence
government to order such relations, are natural to mankind; or
it has been said that virtue (whether for one's own personal
good, temporal or eternal, or for the good of all, or for virtue's
own sake)-that the promotion of virtue is why governments
are instituted; or it has been said that it is for the common
good (whether the good of some community or of mankind)
that governments are instituted.
But the Declaration of Independence seems to take for
granted-finds to be self-evident-that governments are instituted to secure the rights that all men have inasmuch as they
are created equal. It is with this relation-the relation of private rights to public law-that I am primarily concerned on
this occasion.
II.
The rights with which men are endowed seem quite
varied, even if one limits oneself to those which are listed in
the Declaration of Independence. (Others are indicated, since
the ones listed are introduced, "that among these . . .") Is
there not likely to be conflict (as well as diversity) among
these rights? Thus, for example, those measures which secure
one's right to life may interfere with the exercise of liberty.
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Is there a natural hierarchy among the inalienable rights
of men? Is there a principle of ordering them which permits
us to see and to say that one is to be preferred to the others?
(What is the bearing on this question of the right of revolution? I will return to this at the end of this talk.)
Is the variety among the rights such, and is the evanhandedness with which they are asserted such, that it is difficult to insist on any hierarchy among them? (Is there any
indication, in the ways that violations of various rights are spoken of in the list of grievances in the Declaration of Independence, what kind of rights is taken most seriously?) One
people may prefer one right to all the others; another people
may prefer another right to all the others.
If preferences differ from one people to another, if not
even from one man to another, would it not make sense to provide for a variety of ways (or forms of government) for securing these rights? The more variety, the greater the opportunity
people have to gather with those who are likeminded, thereby
securing in the way they prefer the rights that matter most to
them.
If a premium is placed upon such variety-and does not
this make sense if the securing of rights, variously arranged in
order of personal preference, is the principal end of government?-if a premium is placed upon variety, then local governments become more important, those governments which are
tailored to diverse ways in various localities within a large
union. A union may be large in part because it alone can provide the protection needed against foreign interference with
being allowed to live as people desire from one locality to the
other.
And so it was recognized by the Founding Fathers that the
States reflected different manners, preferences, indeed ways of
life. Experiments of one kind and another had led to some
diversity among the regions of the United States. Governments dedicated to those regions could be expected to be more
respectful of, and more intimately related to, the diversity to
be found there, including diversity with respect to which of the
inalienable rights one cared most for. (Thus, one community
could care more than another for property in preference to
liberty.)
A government for all of the United States, on the other
hand, tends to reflect, perhaps even to impose, one set of pref-
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erences over another for the Union as a whole. Is it apt to do
so on the basis of a more elevated opinion as to which is truly
to be preferred? Or is it apt to settle upon those preferences
which can most easily be made to have a general appeal, irrespective of their intrinsic merits?
With these observations about the importance of the
States because of their sensitivity to local manners and opinions, we move into the Federal Convention, that remarkable
assembly which met in 1787. One of the issues which divided
the Convention during that hot Philadelphia summer was
what the status of the States should be under the constitution
that was being written. This was, at least in part, the issue of
which private rights were to be made most of in devising the
fundamental public law of the United States.
III.
It is again and again evident, whenever one studies the
accounts we have of the proceedings of the Federal Convention
of 1787, that there is a significant relation between the private
and the public. Respect for the private, or a restraint upon the
public, may be seen in the very way the Convention was conducted: it was a closed (a closed, not a clandestine) convention.
But, it should at once be added, this was done more for the
sake of the public than for the sake of the private. That is, it
was decided by those experienced men of 1787 that the public
interest was best served by permitting conscientious delegates
to explore fully the issues before them, to make trial runs, and
to back off when persuaded (all which manuevers are much
harder to execute when everything one says immediately
becomes a matter of public record and when constituents line
up behind this or that position). (Is this, one might well wonder, as near as one can hope to get to "philosophy" in practical
discourse on public matters?)
Furthermore, is a proper respect for the private vital to a
healthy public life? If things are made public prematurely, or
improperly, does not the private become perverted by public
considerations? I mention in passing that these questions may
be at the heart of the obscenity issue or of the issue about
whether confidential deliberations by courts and others should
be exposed to public view. (Consider the implications in all
this of the opinion, such as seems to be found in Hobbes' Levia-

1987]

Appendix C. PrivateRights and Public Law

559

than, that the private, or personal, is somehow real, whereas
the public is somehow artificial.)
I mention, in passing, that Benjamin Franklin indicated, at
the end of the Federal Convention, that he had reservations
about parts of the Constitution they had just written but that
these reservations would die with him. Does this raise a question whether James Madison should have provided for the
publication of his notes? That remarkable publication does
remind us of what men are capable of in such circumstances.
But would they be equally capable in the future if it is known
that a publishable record is being made? (Still, it was obvious
to the delegates that Madison was making elaborate notes.)
IV.
The importance of private rights is reflected in what was
said in the Federal Convention about what it is that government should aim at. Or, perhaps it should be said, the importance of private rights may best be seen in the repeated
insistence in the Convention upon what government should
not aim at. Glory and empire should not be the primary ends
of government; conquest and the use of force abroad should be
discouraged.
The ends of government, various delegates indicated,
should be much more modest. (It is a nice question whether
those who believed this most strongly tended to be those who
made much of the States as against the Union.) Such delegates
probably were most concerned about domestic tranquility and
an assured (and ever-growing?) prosperity. Is it thus that one's
pursuit of happiness is best secured? (Is there not something
Hobbesian about this too? A thirst for glory is illusory in its
object, if not simply mad?)
But even these men, who can be said to have made so
much of the securing of private rights, were aware of the significance of what they were doing, for which, if they should
prove successful, they would be celebrated widely and for generations to come. It was several times said in the Convention
that they were deciding perhaps forever the fate of republican
government for all mankind. They were concerned lest they so
conduct themselves that they would be objects of enduring
reproach.
Thus, these men sought, and seemed to enjoy prospec-
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tively, the somewhat private satisfaction of becoming public
benefactors who would be recognized to be such.
V.
I have been talking about how a concern for private rights
and private interests have determined, or at least have very
much affected, such things as public law and the goals of government. Thus, the concern for private rights predisposes
Americans toward a critical role for the States, toward "modest" government, and toward encouraging local institutions,
private as well as public. This is one element in our constitutional development.
Another element in that development, and evident
throughout the Convention proceedings, was the recognition of
the limitations placed upon the delegates by the country's circumstances. It was again and again said by delegates that they
should not try to write the very best constitution; the circumstances simply were not right for that. It takes time, they said,
to develop the conditions which make the best possible: thus, a
certain kind of people is needed for the very best constitution;
since the American people are not yet that kind, the form of
government appropriate to them has to be a compromise with
the best. (This is one thing, by the way, which it would have
been difficult to face up to, and to say, if the Convention proceedings had been public.)
The best constitution previously known to mankind, it
seemed, was that found in Great Britain-in that very country
from which the American colonists had been obliged to separate themselves! That the British constitution was indeed the
best was several times acknowledged during the Convention
without, so far as I know, ever having been contradicted at
length. (There is a critical problem here which I can do no
more than touch upon in this investigation of the relation
between private rights and public law: is "the best constitution
in the world" one that was itself considered by the British people, or by students of that constitution, to have been instituted
to secure the rights of men? Or was it instituted for some
other purpose? Liberty was regarded by Blackstone as vital to
that constitution.)
VI.
The British Constitution (it was again and again lamented
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in the Federal Convention) is simply not feasible for the
American people, at least for a century or two. But it is not
only because the people of the United States are not constituted as the British are that a British-style constitution is not
now feasible, although this difference in peoples was made the
most of.
Also of some importance was a concern, especially among
delegates from the smaller States, that the prerogatives of all
of the States be respected, prerogatives for which the Articles
of Confederation had provided a model but which a unitary
British-style constitution would override. Each State under
the Articles had an equal vote; but delegates from the larger
States complained that they had had to agree to that kind of
equality during the war because of the great dangers facing the
country; and, such delegates added, they were no longer under
such duress, and so would not allow all States to continue to
have an equal voice in the government.
The smaller States spoke of the integrity of their communities, of their equal status among the States, and of the state
of nature which all the States had been in (with respect to one
another) before forming the Union. Their opponents, although
they would not speak so bluntly in the Convention, considered
any major concern about protecting the prerogatives of States
primarily the concern of local political men of little talent but
of established appetites who were afraid they would be pushed
aside if American politics became truly national.
It is likely that some selfishness was exhibited here in
defense of the interests of States as States. But there must
also have been considerable concern about respecting differences due to geography, "history," and so forth. On the other
hand, the very things that made the States important (as
champions of the private rights of men) also made them a hindrance to the formation of a national government with sufficient powers to secure those private rights effectively.
(Perhaps it can be said that to rely upon the prerogatives of
the smaller States was, in effect, the most critical defense of
the prerogatives of States as States, since the larger States
could be considered as tending, in their size and hence in their
approach to government, toward the perspective of a national
government.)
The Convention debated this State-equality issue extensively. It may be true (as some argued) that the small State-
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large State difference was not the fundamental one that summer, but it certainly was important and it had to be resolved.
The resolution took the form, as we know, of the now-familiar
differences between the two Houses of Congress, with the Senate (based upon equal votes for all States) being in this respect
more like the one-house legislature under the Articles of Confederation. In fact, even the name "Congress" for our national
legislature reflects its origins in a body which was made up
under the Articles of Confederation of deputations from
States, just as would be a Congress in which sovereign nations
are represented, with each equal as State to the others. (There
are other features of the Constitution which still respect the
claims of the small States to be treated as equals to the large:
consider, for example, how States vote in Congress in the
event no President is elected by Presidential electors or how
States vote on proposed constitutional amendments.)
The States continue to be recognized as significant elements under the Constitution, so much so that all new States
admitted to the Union came in with the prerogatives of the
original thirteen.
VII.
To make much of the States and the way things happened
to be arranged under the Articles of Confederation and otherwise is to defer considerably to chance developments. Is this
inevitable in public life? A private person can become, if he is
fortunate in his training, natural gifts and circumstances, less
susceptible to chance than can any public person or any community. Does not the life of philosophy mean, in effect, a temporary conquest of chance, both with respect to the mode of
one's life and with respect to the primary end of one's life (a
comprehensive understanding of the meaning of things)?
And yet, leading members of the Federal Convention
could insist that, for Americans at least, reason is to govern,
not chance alone. (See, on this, the opening passage of Federalist No. 1.) Such a response was made, for example, when it
was suggested that a lottery be relied upon to choose among
certain candidates for office. (Compare ancient Athens, where
democratic principles were indeed carried to this "logical"
extreme.) The insistence upon reason, rather than upon
chance, was in opposition to sentiments (such as those by John
Dickenson) which presupposed that the most useful political

1987]

Appendix C: Private Rights and Public Law

563

things have evolved among men by accident. It is not an accident, perhaps, that Dickenson had been reluctent to invoke the
right of revolution against the British: does not that right and
its invocation make more than he was inclined to do of deliberate appraisals and of systematic refashioning of one's government? Should one expect also that those who made more of
chance would also make more of the States as against a strong
national government which ignored arbitrary State lines as
much as possible?
Be all this as it may, we do see a remarkable reliance upon
reasoning in the Federal Convention. Is not this related to the
assumption in the Declaration of Independence itself that reasons should be given for the action the colonists were taking,
that a people should at least try to explain itself? Is there not
a natural openness in man to reasoning, especially in political
relations? Perhaps significant here is the fact that anyone who
tries to rule is likely to advance some plausible title to rule.
(See Plato, Laws 690A sq.)
VIII.
Among the things that reasonable men in politics knowamong the things prudent men know (for that is what reasonin-the-life-of-action comes down to?)-is that statesmen are
indeed limited by their circumstances.
We have already noticed the account that had to be taken
of the established prerogatives (and expectations) of the States.
And we have already noticed the inadvisability of contemporaneous public discourse on the sensitive matters discussed in the
Federal Convention.
But more critical, and perhaps at the root of all such circumstantial restraints, are the limitations of the people themselves. (This is aside from what had been noticed about the
differences between the American people and the British people or between one State and another in the American Union.)
The limitations of the people are particularly important here,
since the American emphasis upon equality and upon the
determination to be republican made so much of the people.
It is again and again indicated in the Federal Convention
that the people can be easily led astray, that their understanding is limited, and so forth. And this can be said even as the
constitutional system devised is one that ultimately rests upon
the people's will.
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Ix.
The limitations of the people are not restricted to their
capacities as citizens (including the productive or private lives
with which citizenship has to be somewhat concerned).
We are reminded here of another people, with its peculiar
limitations, those second-class (or three-fifth class) citizens
who made up the considerable body of African slaves in the
United States in 1787.
Their limitations, due in large part both to the way of life
from which they had been wrenched and to the way of life to
which they had been condemned, affected what could be done
with them. In addition, slavery (with its attendant investments, costs and discipline) affected the prosperity and happiness of the whites among whom the slaves lived.
And yet all the time, there was the continuing awareness
that the principles of the regime (as seen in the "created
equal" language of the Declaration of Independence) raised a
question about the institution of slavery. Northerners and
Southerners alike were aware of this as a problem. (Consider,
for example, how bitterly so hardheaded a commerce-minded
man as Gouverneur Morris could condemn slavery. Consider,
also, James Madison's reluctance to have it explicitly recognized in the Constitution itself that there could be such a thing
as property in men.)
The importance of this issue can be seen, of course, in the
Civil War and what led up to it. But the issue was vital from
the beginning-and so it could be said by Madison and by
others in the Federal Convention that the slavery issue was
what really divided the States, not such differences as those
between large States and small States.
X.
One can see in the slavery issue that deep conflict among
private rights which I touched upon early in my remarks on
this occasion. There are, of course, the rights of Africans to
their lives and liberty. (Notice how Chief Justice Roger D.
Taney and Senator Stephen A. Douglas dealt with this: they
simply read the African out of the Declaration of Independence.) Then there were the rights of the Southern white
man-his right to his property (duly paid for) and his right to
self-preservation (which was threatened by emancipation): it
was widely believed that wholesale emancipation would bring
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bankruptcy for whites in the South, a general breakdown of
law and order, and the misery of helpless Africans. It is important for us to appreciate why and how good men of considerable political talent "had to" acquiesce in slavery.
The slavery issue (an issue which would not die and the
aftereffects of which continue among us in various forms)
reminds us of the fundamental tension between expediency
and justice. Still, it was recognized in the Federal Convention,
at least by some members, that unless a political arrangement
is just, it cannot be expected to endure.
Does recourse to expediency tend to respect private rights
and the limitations of people? It may be seen in the use of
extraordinary measures in perilous times (which recourse to
the Convention can itself be understood to have been).
Does a concern for justice, on the other hand, tend to
make more of universal standards of the common good, perhaps even of the requirements of humanity at large? Does it
not tend to discourage an emphasis upon private rights? Is it
not a concern for "the whole human race" (to use Gouverneur
Morris' phrase) a concern for more than the mere amalgamation of everyone's private rights? A concern for private rights
is not as likely (at least in our circumstances) to look to Nature
for guidance as is a concern for the common good: "the common good" implies, more than do "private rights," the ascendancy of an enduring perfection over transient satisfactions in
our judgments both as human beings and as citizens.
XI.
The problem of reconciling expediency and justice may be
seen as well in the problem (recognized again and again in the
Federal Convention) of dealing with avarice and with ambition. The concern was to deal with avarice and ambition, not
to eliminate them. Avarice is useful in the commercial life of
the community and ambition is useful in its political life.
Does an efficient commercial life, especially on a continent-wide basis, tend to promote certain desires, to break down
State barriers, and to make people more or less uniform? Does
it also tend to discourage the arbitrary and the shortsighted
and the foolish, by making them vulnerable both in the market
place and before a national public opinion?
It was indicated in the Convention that the most effective
way of dealing with avarice, and perhaps also with ambition-a
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way which does not require constant governmental intervention but depends much more instead on people to police themselves-is to allow vice to counter vice. This is not an appeal to
higher principles, but rather to the natural workings of selfinterest. This may be seen in Douglas' position with respect to
the spread of slavery: there was, he believed, no need publicly
to condemn slavery, which would antagonize the South against
the North; rather, he depended upon white prejudices-the
prejudices of free labor against Africans and hence slavery-to
keep slavery from taking root in the Territories.
The use, as well as the limits, of vice to counter (and hence
control) vice may be seen in a playful illustration by Franklin.
The Scottish lawyers, he reported, manage to keep the quality
of their courts high by always choosing as judges those of their
colleagues who are most successful-and this they do, he
explained, in order to be able to divide their prosperous colleagues' practice among themselves. But, it should be noticed,
this approach can operate to produce judges of quality only so
long as successful lawyers, whose competition is thereby eliminated by their colleagues, are successful for the right reasons
and in the right way.
XII.
There is a further problem with any reliance upon vice to
counteract vice. When vice is set against vice, are not both of
the vices involved somehow being legitimated? What are the
consequences of such legitimation? May it even lead to a failure, in some circumstances, to recognize vice as vice? If something should come not to be recognized as a vice, may not
people neglect to set another vice against it? (Is this problem
critical to any appraisal of the workings of economic theories?)
Besides, if these are indeed vices, are they not ultimately
irrational? If so, would it not be a matter of chance who or
what did prevail when vices contend with one another? (Is
there for this approach no natural hierarchy among vices, just
as there is no natural hierarchy among rights?) If vices are to
be used intelligently (and to be discarded or rearranged as
need requires), must there not be higher principles by which
one should be guided (in making use of vices) and to which one
can appeal (in opposition to certain vices)? That is, must not
one sometimes raise people above considerations of mere selfinterest?
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Consider in this connection the suggestion made by Franklin at a critical point in the Federal Convention, when an
impasse had been reached: he suggested that the delegates
begin opening each day's session with prayer, for they were
obviously in need of divine help. Franklin's proposal seems to
have been embarrassing to some of the more freethinking delegates; yet it could not be simply voted down: not only would
this have been an affront to the venerable Franklin but not a
few of the more pious Convention delegates would have been
offended. The proposal was allowed to fade away without a
vote on it, reflecting a sensitivity on each side to the sensibilities of the other side.
What did the prayer proposal really come down to? Was it
not a way of inducing members to step back, to get outside
their particular, divisive interests? To pray-or, indeed, to call
for prayer-is to ask, in effect, "How would all this look to
someone whose good opinion you cherish?" Did, for Franklin
(who was, to say the least, not conventionally pious)--did, for
Franklin, the proposal itself matter most, not any prayer
thereafter? Did he not succeed therefore in what he
attempted, even though official prayers were never resorted to
in the Convention?
The decision of Franklin to proceed thus does suggest that
self-interest (or an overriding concern for private right) cannot
always be enough. Much should be made of self-interest, sensibly pursued (that is, what is called enlightened self-interest),
but it must itself be subject to principles grounded in Nature
which regulate reliance upon it. In any event, an emphasis
upon personal virtues is more likely than is an emphasis upon
private rights to aim at excellence, an excellence which tends
to be public (if not even philosophical) in its orientation. An
emphasis upon private rights, on the other hand, easily leads to
an insistence upon an undiscriminating equality, to a recourse
to private lives, perhaps even to a suppression of liberty (so
long as all are similarly restrained).
XIII.
The need to rely (in the Franklin mode) upon higher principles is reflected in the observation, made in the Federal Convention, that since the sentiments of the people are hard to
know it is best simply to do the right thing and depend upon
the people eventually to recognize and ratify this.
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It is also difficult to be sure of what the enduring interests
of any people are: circumstances are so varied and so changeable, that those interests may not be what they seem at the
moment. Thus, it was pointed out in the Convention, for the
delegates to make much of the immediate interests of their
States, or to institute special privileges for the thirteen original
States, or to place limitations upon the new Western States
would be shortsighted, since the delegates themselves could
not know where their own descendants would live and what
they would be doing.
Besides, what is truly in one's interest if one's soul is big, if
one is open to the noble? Is it not better to aim at what is good
and right, not just for the moment, but on a permanent basis,
not just for individuals but for the "whole human race"?
With these observations we can return to the Declaration
of Independence passage with which we began on this occasion.
If this securing of rights (and private rights at that) is the primary end of our government, and if there is no natural hierarchy among such rights, then our way of life can easily
deteriorate into hedonism or mere selfish gratification. (There
is much in our way of life that encourages self-indulgence,
especially since our remarkable material abundance naturally
tempts us in that direction.)
It is instructive to notice, therefore, that the Declaration
does conclude with an emphasis upon "our sacred Honor,"
which points us to something outside of ourselves. At the
least, "honor" suggests a community response, preferably that
of self-sacrifice in the interest of something elevated.
It is instructive to notice as well that the right of revolution is the only right in the Declaration of Independence that
also is referred to as a duty. If rights were all that mattered,
one would be left the choice of whether to insist upon them.
One can "legitimately" neglect one's rights (and why not do so
if one is comfortable and self-absorbed?)
But where duty is involved, it is different. To speak of
duty is to presuppose standards. At the very least, it would
seem from the Declaration, men have the obligation to insist
that governments respect those rights which attest to and permit full development of their humanity, in private as well as in
public, that humanity which is reflected in the self-evident
truth that "all men are created equal."
What did the Founders believe about all this, especially
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about whether a concern for private rights should take precedence over respect for public law (when these are in conflict
with one another)? We have been considering what various
members of the Federal Convention thought about this subject. But, as we have seen, the opinions of the people at large
may have been different. This is reflected in what has been
noticed about the limitations of the people. Indeed, one suspects, the people might have been less "sophisticated" than
some of their leaders about the primacy of private rights. That
is, do not a healthy people tend to be patriotic? Do they not
tend to believe that there are eternal principles superior to private rights and interests, whatever they might personally tend
to settle for in practice? Does the American openness to justice, as commonly understand, indicate that private rights
might not be fundamental among us? Certainly one of the
most exalted of rights, freedom of speech, has a decidedly public cast to it.
Are not the people of the United States the true founders
of this regime, that people for whom the delegates in the Federal Convention acted and in the name of whom the Constitution itself is proclaimed? Americans do seem to remain a
people who, whatever self-centeredness there is in their
increasing absorption with private life, still by and large naturally consider public law, or the concern for justice and the
common good, as ultimately taking precedence over private
rights.
With these observations I suggest that the apparent
emphasis in the Declaration of Independence upon the primacy
of private rights may have been unnaturally influenced by
political theorists. But then, I further suggest, the enduring
appeal of the Declaration of Independence for the American
people may not truly have been because of any apparent
emphasis therein upon private rights but rather because of the
public-spirited nobility that that Declaration displays in its
appeal to justice, to the sacred, and to the common good-a
prudent appeal which all men are expected to be able to
respond to by nature.

